Bivariate and multivariate scaled association models. An application to homogamy of social origin and education in Hungary between 1930 and 1979

In this article we compare bivariate and multivariate models for homogamy of social origin and education to test whether bivariate models of homogamy lead to biased results. We use data on Hungarian couples married between 1930 and 1979 and loglinear models of scaled association. The results indicate some differences between bivariate and multivariate analyses. At each point of time bivariate models overestimate homogamy, both with respect to education and social origin. However, results on trends in time do not differ much between the two analyses. The exception is the period 1940–1959, in which bivariate analysis showed decreasing educational homogamy, and multivariate analysis showed an increasing trend. The latter finding can be explained by declining homogamy of social origin, as well as the weaker reproduction and cross-effects in this period.     

Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia

We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected.     

Consumption in a vacuum

In recent years, economics has paid increasing attention to the phenomenon of consumption. Insights from outside of the mainstream and from outside of economics proper have found inroads as well. Largely neglected in previous decades, consumption theory in economics was the exclusive domain for technical discussions only for a long time, as the articles selected by the late Kevin Lancaster show. Consumption of many goods is, however, highly symbolic—consumption behavior is in large part about institutionalized communication where instrumental considerations do not necessarily play an important role. Some of the most promising ideas that can be developed further in economics to better understand consumption behavior are presented.     

How Central Is Too Central? Organizing Interorganizational Collaboration Networks for Breakthrough Innovation

Firms increasingly look to collaboration with alliance partners in their quest for breakthrough innovation. But how does the position of a firm in its alliance network weighted by the centrality of its partners—a concept which we term “partner‐weighted alliance centrality”—and the heterogeneities in the types of partners that it cooperates with—in terms of its private‐public collaboration—influence this quest? Using longitudinal data from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, we build alliance networks in the period 1985–2001 to investigate these questions. We show that, for breakthrough innovation, collaborating with more partners that are more central in alliance networks the better, but only to a point. Beyond that point, we find that the likelihood of achieving breakthrough innovation drops. Furthermore, and looking at the kinds of knowledge provided by the partners in each firm's alliances, we report that firms with a greater share of private partners, relative to public partners, suffer less from the diminishing benefits of collaboration with central partners when developing breakthrough innovation. Taken together, we make novel contributions about how to organize for breakthrough innovation, and provide actionable managerial advice in terms of selecting collaborative partners in alliance networks.     

Theory-Driven Choice Models

We explore issues in theory-driven choice modeling by focusing on partial-equilibrium models of dynamic structural demand with forward-looking decision-makers, full equilibrium models that integrate the supply side, integration of bounded rationality in dynamic structural models of choice and public policy implications of these models.     

FOOD COST STABILIZATION USING FOOD COUPONS*

Given the goal of food cost stability, this paper proposes a consumer subsidy plan via food coupons. Graphic models of such a plan and the more conventional alternatives—price, control and consumer subsidy without use of coupons—are presented to describe how the schemes would operate and the direct effects which they might have. Simulation is then used to estimate their likely effects. Finally, the relative merits of the alternative stabilizing schemes are discussed from a policy point of view.
Ayant en vue le but de la stabilisation des couts alimentaires, cet article propose au consommateurs tin plan de subvention par coupons. Des modèles graphiques ďun tel plan el les alternatives plus tradilionnelles (c'est à dire contrôle de prix et subvention sans coupons') sont présentés afin de décrire les opérations et les effets qu'ils pourraient avoir. La simulation est employée afin de déterminer leurs consequences probables. Enfin les mérites relatifs des alternatives qui stabilize les prix sont discutés du point de vue politique.