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Veronika Grimm Frank Riedel Elmar Wolfstetter 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2003,21(10):1557-1569
The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids. 相似文献
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The literature on research and development contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present article analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit himself to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare fixed‐prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result is that preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction, and the optimal fixed‐prize tournament is more profitable than the optimal auction. 相似文献
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Abstract. This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator
is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism, characterize
the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these
mechanisms avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.
Received: 7 May 2001 / Accepted: 24 June 2002
We would like to thank seminar participants at Bonn and Berlin, in particular Peter Bank, Wieland Müller, and Urs Schweizer,
the two anonymous referees, and the associate editor for most useful and exceptionally detailed comments. Financial support
was received by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 373 (“Quantifikation und Simulation ?konomischer Prozesse”), Humboldt–Universit?t zu Berlin. 相似文献
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Fiscal policy and the classical growth cycle 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Prof. Dr. Elmar Wolfstetter 《Journal of Economics》1982,42(4):375-393
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Intereconomics - A number of shortcomings in Germany’s efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus, including fraudulent testing, vaccination fraud and insufficient testing capacity have... 相似文献
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Wei Ding Cuihong Fan Elmar G. Wolfstetter 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2013,31(5):382-391
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals' beliefs through their bids. We compare cash and profit-share auctions, first- and second-price, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if synergies are low, bidders are subject to a positive externality with positive probability; nevertheless, pooling does not occur. Unlike cash auctions, profit-share auctions are not revenue equivalent, and the second-price profit-share auction is more profitable than the other auctions. 相似文献
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AUCTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 总被引:13,自引:0,他引:13
Elmar Wolfstetter 《Journal of economic surveys》1996,10(4):367-420
Abstract. This is a detailed introduction to auction theory. It begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules. The basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion, multi-unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion. Then follows an introduction to optimal auctions, with and without stochastic entry, and to common value auctions and the winner's curse problem. The survey closes with a sample of applications, from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market. 相似文献
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A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44. 相似文献