A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF LEADERSHIP: PARTICIPATION AS A FUNCTION OF PROBLEM STRUCTURE AND LEADER POWER

This study explores the effects of task structure and leader power on participative leadership across Australian, African, Papua-New Guinea and Pacific Island managers. Managers in all national groups are more participative in situations of low structure and low power than for high structure and high power, respectively. Participation in situations of low structure and low power declines in the order: Australia, Africa, Papua-New Guinea, Pacific Islands. It is argued that this effect is an instrumental effect of managerial education, rather than being culturally determined. the Vroom-Yetton leadership methodology is used to measure participation levels. Subjects are a total of 150 middle-level managers attending management education courses.     

The Dynamics of SME Information Systems

The process by which small firms (SMEs) invest in and gain benefit from information systems (IS) is little understood. This paper analyses two alternative models of IS-based strategic change – the Focus-Dominance model (Levy et al., 2001) and stages of growth models as applied to SMEs. An analysis of the outcomes of IS strategy development undertaken for 43 SMEs maps their IS use over time. The analysis supports the Focus-Dominance model, some parts of the stages of growth model and extends the critique of the latter. Further variances are explained by the entrepreneur/owner's values and experience. One structural variable, namely, the industry sector may also explain the variances. The implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

The effects of budget goals and task interdependence on the level of and variance in performance: a research note

The effects of goal setting and task interdependence on both the level of and variance in performance are examined using a laboratory, resource allocation task. The results show, consistent with existing research, main effects for goal setting and task interdependence on the level of performance, but no goal setting by task interaction effect as hypothesised. The results also show that an increase in task interdependence increases performance variance but that goal setting reduces it with important implications for budget setting.     

The interaction between a standard time incentive payment scheme and a simple accounting information system

Under a standard time incentive payment scheme, workers “manage” their recorded job times. A job cost accounting system allocates labour costs and sometimes overheads on the basis of the recorded job times. By simulating the interaction of two such systems at a medium sized engineering firm, it is found that the direct labour costs for a product could be over-estimated by up to 35%. Further, these over-estimates occur on those products on which the workers earn their highest bonuses and, hence, whose discontinuation could damage industrial relations.