The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating

In this study, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of payoff‐irrelevant peer‐to‐peer ratings as a cooperation enforcement device in a finitely repeated public goods game setting. We run two treatments that differ in the amount of information on own and others' received rating points provided to the players, whereas, in a third treatment, we analyze peer approval when assigning ratings to others is costly. In particular, we wonder whether, even under anonymity and in the absence of reputational concerns, (a) players rate others' contribution decisions in the expected direction and (b) the peer rating mechanisms under study foster cooperation and welfare. Our findings reveal that, in the two costless rating treatments, peer rating concerns lead to higher contributions and efficiency, compared to our control. Introducing a small fixed cost for assigning rating points results in a very high percentage of subjects deciding not to rate others' behavior, so that cooperation cannot be enforced.     

Relational consumption and nonlinear dynamics in an overlapping generations model

In this paper, we show that incorporating the relational dimension into an otherwise standard OLG model and focusing on dynamic leisure externalities leads to dramatically different predictions. Here, we show that when the old perceive private and relational consumption as substitutable goods, a series of interesting dynamic outcomes—such as local indeterminacy, nonlinear phenomena (including chaotic dynamics) and even multiple equilibria with global indeterminacy—may arise. We also draw some welfare implications and relate them to the well-known “happiness paradox” arising within contemporary affluent societies.     

Can Risk‐Averse Households Make Risky Investments? The Role of Trust in Others

In this paper, using data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, 2006 and 2013 waves), we illustrate the link between individuals’ attitudes to financial risk combined with their willingness to trust others, and their investments in risky assets. Individuals who display either risk tolerance alone or – to a lesser extent – risk aversion and trust more frequently decide to buy risky assets. The comparison between Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries indicates that trust plays qualitatively different roles depending on the prevailing combination of risk attitude and trust in the area being studied.     

Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis

We analyze social dynamics in a continuous population where randomly matched individuals have to choose between two pure strategies only ('cooperate' (C) and 'not cooperate' (NC)). Individual payoffs associated with the possible outcomes of each interaction may differ across groups, depending on the specific social and cultural context to which each agent belongs. In particular, it is assumed that three sub-populations are initially present, 'framing' the game according to the prisoner's dilemma (PD), assurance game (AG) and other regarding (OR) payoff configurations, respectively. In other words, we assume that common knowledge about the payoffs of the game is 'culturally-specific'. In this context, we examine both the adoption process of strategies C and NC within each sub-population and the diffusion process of 'types' (PD, AG and OR) within the overall community. On the basis of an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, the paper focuses on the problem of coexistence of PD, AG and OR groups as well as of 'nice' (C) and 'mean' (NC) strategies. We show that coexistence between C and NC is possible in the heterogeneous community under examination, even if it is ruled out in homogeneous communities where only one of the three types is present. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.