旅游学方法论：何来“主义”之争？——与宋子千、张斌等人商榷

宋子千的《旅游研究方法论的实证主义与现象学之争》（简称《之争》）一文将申葆嘉先生的“旅游是市场经济的产物”和谢彦君教授的“旅游的本质是体验”分别作为旅游学研究中实证主义和现象学方法的代表性观点而对立起来。实际上, 不管是在当代旅游学界, 还是在申、谢两位学者之间, 都不存在关于研究方法论的“主义”之争一说。《之争》在未考虑科学研究中不同类型的问题需要不同的方法的情况下对两位学者的立场做出了武断的批评, 如果不予以澄清, 很可能会引起学术界在此类问题上的无谓甚至错误的争论, 误导学术研究的方向。同时, 《之争》在现象学的分析和技术理性等概念的使用上还有诸多值得商榷之处, 另有若干细节问题亦需要进一步澄清。鉴于旅游学在我国的发展还处于较为初步的阶段, 对旅游学基础理论的讨论必须秉持客观、严谨和科学的态度, 该文旨在与《之争》中的若干观点做一些商榷性的讨论。     

Post-Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22

Despite the long experience in the U.S. with restructuring companies in bankruptcy, there remains a persistent tendency for companies to emerge from Chapter 11 with too much debt and too little profitability. In this article, the author uses a variant of his well-known "Z-Score" bankruptcy prediction model to assess the future viability of companies when emerging from bankruptcy, including the likelihood that they will file again—a surprisingly common phenomenon that is now referred to as "Chapter 22."
The author reports that those companies that filed second bankruptcy petitions were both significantly less profitable and more highly leveraged than those that emerged and continued as going concerns. Indeed, the average financial profile and bond rating equivalent for the "Chapter 22" companies on emerging from their first bankruptcies were not much better than those of companies in default.
The authors findings also suggest that a credible corporate distress prediction model could be used as an independent, unbiased method for assessing the future viability of proposed reorganization plans. Another potential application of the model is by the creditors of the "old" company when assessing the investment value of the new package of securities, including new equity, offered in the plan.     

省级国土资源信息化建设现状及对策分析--以山东省国土资源信息化建设为例

摘要:为国土资源管理部门更好地履行政府管理职能,提高国土资源行政管理水平,实现国土资源管理信息化本文以山东省国土资源信息化建设为例,简要分析了省级国土资源信息化建设的情况。     

Venture Capital in Canada: Lessons for Building (or Restoring) National Wealth

Canadian policymakers and regulators have been praised for avoiding many of the policy blunders that, when combined with excessive risk-taking by the banks, nearly brought down the U.S. financial sector. But, as the global economy begins to recover, policymakers everywhere need to find ways to stimulate the creation of new ventures.
On that score, Canada's record is not encouraging. The returns on Canadian venture capital investment have been dismally low, particularly in its government-run funds. In a recent survey, 40% of U.S. venture capital partners identified Canada as having the least favorable treatment of investors of any country they had dealings with. And perhaps most troubling, half of the Canadian corporate executives responding to another survey cited "inability to retain talent" as the biggest threat to their firms.
The authors begin by suggesting that these findings are all related. Without investors and the know-how and networks they bring with them, a country's ability to attract, develop, and retain top talent—business and managerial talent in particular—is significantly reduced. And as the authors go on to argue, the key to building a successful venture capital industry is to match talent with capital in such a way that all three parties—talent, capital providers, and the "matchmakers" who bring together talent and capital—are rewarded for superior performance and held accountable for failure.     

Innovation-Oriented Culture in the Public Sector: Do managerial autonomy and result control lead to innovation?

This article examines the effect of specific new public management (NPM)-related characteristics to explain innovation-oriented culture within public sector organizations. According to NPM doctrines, an enhanced managerial autonomy combined with result control will stimulate a more innovation-oriented culture in such organizations. Using multi-country survey data of over 200 public sector agencies, we test for the influence of organizational autonomy, result control and their interactions, on innovation-oriented culture. High levels of managerial autonomy and result control have independent and positive effects. However, the interaction between high personnel management autonomy and high result control has a negative effect.     

The Future of Private Equity

A distinguished University of Chicago financial economist and longtime observer of private equity markets responds to questions like the following:

• ? With a track record that now stretches in some cases almost 30 years, what have private equity firms accomplished? What effects have they had on the performance of the companies they invest in, and have they been good for the economy?
• ? How will highly leveraged PE portfolio companies fare during the current downturn, especially with over $400 billion of loans coming due in the next three to five years?
• ? With PE firms now sitting on an estimated $500 billion in capital and leveraged loan markets shut down, are the firms now contemplating new kinds of investment that require less debt?
• ? If and when the industry makes a comeback, do you expect any major changes that might allow us to avoid another boom‐and‐bust cycle? Have the PE firms or their investors made any obvious mistakes that contribute to such cycles, and are they now showing any signs of having learned from those mistakes?

Despite the current problems, the operating capabilities of the best PE firms, together with their ability to manage high leverage and the increased receptiveness of public company CEOs and boards to PE investments, have all helped establish private equity as “a permanent asset class.” Although many of the deals done in 2006 and 2007 were probably overpriced, the “cov‐lite” deal structures, deferred repayments of principal, and larger coverage ratios have afforded more room for reworking troubled deals. As a result of that flexibility, and of the kinds of companies that get taken private in leveraged deals in the first place, most troubled PE portfolio companies should end up being restructured efficiently, thereby limiting the damage to the overall economy. Part of the restructuring process involves the use of the PE industry's huge stockpile of capital to purchase distressed debt and inject new equity into troubled deals (in many cases, their own). At the same time the PE firms have been working hard to rescue their own deals, some have been taking significant minority positions in public companies, while gaining some measure of control. Finally, to limit overpriced and overlev‐eraged deals in the future, and so avoid the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to have become a predictable part of the industry, the discussion explores the possibility that the limited partners and debt providers that supply most of the capital for PE investments will insist on larger commitments of equity by sponsors to their own funds and individual deals.