欧洲单一金融市场中的最后贷款人(LLR)

本文研究在欧盟单一金融市场中有效发挥最后贷款人功能所面临的挑战.简要分析了欧盟金融业的一些特点,这些特点可能增加欧盟系统性金融风险;讨论了预防和解决金融问题的欧盟金融稳定构架的复杂性(最后贷款人的运作也包括在这个构架之中);论述了当系统性金融风波影响不止一个欧盟成员国时,如何实现最后贷款人功能.最后提出了提高现有构架效率所面临的挑战和可行的途径.     

Outsourcing with debt financing

This paper investigates the effect of capital structure on a firm’s choice between vertical integration and outsourcing. We model the production decision in a Principal-Agent framework and show that suppliers use debt as a strategic instrument to collect the surplus from outsourcing as their wealth constraint or limited liability ensures them more attractive compensation schemes. Investigating the buyer’s capital structure, we find that outsourcing with risky debt is more likely to occur for high values of the outsourcing surplus.     

Healthy and tasty school snacks: suggestions from Brazilian children consumers

Children do not choose what to eat based on health issues alone, and the high availability of non‐nutritious food in the environment can be a barrier to the consumption of healthy foods. Brazilian children are consuming processed, savoury, rich in fat, sodium and refined carbohydrates rather than more nutrient‐dense foods. Foods offered in public school meals and those sold in private school canteens in Brazil are subject to regulation, but not the snacks brought from home. This study identified the suggestions of public and private school students about the characteristics that a snack should present in order to be considered both healthy and palatable. A qualitative exploratory study using focus groups was conducted with 128 primary school students aged 7–10 years old. Interviews were transcribed and content analysis was conducted, generating three categories: (1) foods actually consumed during snack breaks; (2) examples of foods considered healthy and/or tasty for consumption during snack breaks; and (3) desired characteristics of a healthy and tasty snack. Foods of high energy density and low nutritional value were mentioned as the most consumed snacks, usually brought from home or purchased within/near the schools. Consumption of meals offered by the National School Meal Program was reported by only one‐third of the public school students. Fruits, natural juices and vegetables were considered healthy foods; sweet‐tasting preparations containing fruits were considered tasty; while fruits and natural fruit juices were considered both healthy and tasty. Sweet‐tasting preparations containing fruits were mentioned as examples of snacks with the desired healthy/tasty characteristics. The disparity between what was actually consumed and what was reported as ideal leads us to question the availability in retail stores of healthy yet palatable foods that meet this population's desires.     

Endogenous retailer preferences in intermediate good markets

We model strategic interaction in a differentiated input market as a game among two suppliers and n retailers. Each one of the upstream firms chooses the specification of the input which it will offer.Then, retailers choose their type from a continuum of possibilities. The decisions made in these two first stages affect the degree of compatibility between each retailer's ideal input specification and that of the inputs offered by the two upstream firms. In a third stage, upstream firms compete setting input prices. Equilibrium may be of the two-vendor policy or of the technological monopoly type.     

An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing

Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations.     

Employment adjustment in two countries with poor reputations: Analysis of aggregate, firm, and flow data for Portugal and Germany

This paper supplements aggregate time-series analysis of the speed of employment adjustment with evidence from firm panel and flow data for two countries – Portugal and Germany – sharing unenviable labor market reputations. The Portuguese labor market is often portrayed as terminally inert, while that of Germany as badly ailing. We report broad consistency in the results across data sets in favor of Portugal. In benchmarking Portugal against Germany, the adverse reputation of the former – if not necessarily that of the latter country – may have been exaggerated in contemporary policy debate.We thank, without implicating, two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful remarks on an earlier version of the paper.     

Las diferencias salariales entre países en la Unión Europea

Se investigan los determinantes de las brechas salariales entre países de la Unión Europea a lo largo de la distribución salarial según la propuesta metodológica de Firpo, Fortin y Lemieux (2009) y de Fortin, Lemieux y Firpo (2011). Los efectos de estructura salarial y de composición inciden en las diferencias salariales, aunque el primero de una manera más marcada. Este efecto se deriva de las diferencias entre factores desconocidos, mientras que el efecto de composición se explica principalmente por las diferencias en materia de educación, proporción de trabajadores con responsabilidades de supervisión, estructura ocupacional y, en menor medida, estructura de la actividad económica.     

Corruption and FDI: Does the Use of Distinct Proxies for Corruption Matter?

Abstract

The relationship between FDI and corruption/institutional quality in host countries has been widely analyzed. However, the use of distinct samples and indicators for corruption tends to hinder the interpretation and outcomes of econometric assessments. The aims of this paper are to assess the extent to which the use of distinct proxies for corruption provides diverse evidence regarding the relationship between corruption and FDI, and to assess whether controlling for other indicators of institutional quality reinforces the effect of corruption indicators on FDI inflows. In order to accomplish these goals, we estimate a set of multivariate logistic models using 96 countries over the period 2000 to 2010. The results evidence that using distinct proxies for corruption variables, as well as controlling for other types of the countries’ institutional quality, generate distinct outcomes. In isolation, a country’s transparency and its citizens’ corruption perceptions fail to impact on FDI whereas a bribe-free environment is conducive to FDI inflows. When we control for the human, social and economic development of the countries, the impact of a transparent and bribe-free context on FDI attraction is enhanced. Overall, it is clear that in order to become a large recipient of FDI a country has to guarantee a transparent and bribe-free environment, characterized by low income taxes, high literacy rates and generalized economic freedom (own labor and property control by citizens).     

Are Good Industrial Relations Good for the Economy?

Abstract. Recent US microeconomic analysis indicates that good industrial relations might improve firm performance. Of late, it has also been claimed that the benefits of industrial relations quality – proxied inversely by a strikes variable – could also extend to the macroeconomy. Using cross-country data, we find that, independent of other labor market institutions, a lower strike volume is associated with lower unemployment. Although there is a separate line of causation running from unemployment to strikes, our analysis suggests that this is not dominant. That said, support for the notion that macro performance owes something to good industrial relations is, however, weakened once we formally control for strike endogeneity.