Recent Developments in the Theory of the Firm

Abstract
This article reviews recent literature on the theory of the firm. The issues addressed include the role and determinants of the size of firms, the financial structure and organisation of labour in firms, and the policy implications of this research .     

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.     

Using Technology to Encourage Critical Thinking and Optimal Decision Making in Risk Management Education

This article draws a link between the risk management failures in the financial services industry and the educational philosophy and teaching constraints at business schools. An innovative application of prediction market technology within business education is proposed as a method that can be used to encourage students to think about risk in an open and flexible way. This article explains how prediction markets also provide students with the necessary experience to critically evaluate and stress‐test quantitative risk modeling techniques later in their academic and professional careers.     

The marketing of love: how attachment styles affect romantic consumption journeys

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science - The experience of romantic love is closely interlocked with consumption journeys—yet how and why consumers engage in romantic consumption is not...     

Intraday time and order execution quality dimensions

We examine intraday execution quality patterns on Nasdaq stocks using proprietary order-level data from a US broker dealer. Orders submitted midday execute slower than orders submitted around the open and close. However, midday orders have lower execution costs. Our results indicate that execution speed and execution cost exhibit offsetting intraday time-dependent patterns and these patterns appear to be induced by variations in informed trading levels. While some traders concentrate their trading activity around the open and close, others prefer to trade midday. Traders have varying preferences for when to trade, and offsetting patterns exist between speed and cost. These factors highlight the complexity in defining an optimal trading time, which, among other things, is dependent on the dimensional preferences of individual traders.     

What Influences Trader Choice of Electronic versus Intermediated Execution?

We examine the determinants of US equity trader choice of electronic versus intermediated execution. While traders exhibit a strong overall preference for automation, when the market is less liquid at order submission time, traders seek market maker automated and human order‐matching services more often. Traders' overall tendency to choose intermediaries is highly correlated with their demand for liquidity. Market maker participation rates are higher for more active and larger size traders. Traders who choose intermediaries more often trade more stocks, execute orders quicker, price orders more aggressively, and disperse their trading over longer periods of time. Although US stock intermediaries continue to lose market share, our results highlight the important role these firms can play in an increasingly automated, electronically driven marketplace.     

Mentoring and the tolerance of complexity

This paper explores mentoring in the light of complexity theory and the premium placed upon knowledge in organisational viability. A key question is “what is the role of mentoring, as a developmental and knowledge creating process, in a complex environment?” There are two parts to the discussion. First, we explore complexity at work, and what it means for the individual. We link the central ideas of complexity theory with the notion of a ‘corporate curriculum’, an inclusive concept intended to capture the complex nature of learning at work, in all its variants. Secondly, we speculate on the contribution mentoring can make in complex organisations where employees are part of a knowledge economy by virtue of being knowledge producers and being engaged in learning at work. The environments in which we work are becoming more complex and mentoring is also complex. There is a synergy here. For people living in complexity where there are few rules, no right answers and no predictable outcomes, we suggest that mentoring can play a distinctive role in helping people to ‘tolerate’ complexity and remain effective.     

Debt finance and the cost of management ownership: Some elementary results

Increased debt reduces a company's equity base, which reduces the dollar investment a manager must make to hold a given proportion of stock. Therefore, it is often argued, managers' effort incentives are improved by high leverage. This paper shows that while risky debt reduces the cost of providing managers with substantial equity ownership, the cheaper equity captures less of the fruits of the manager's effort. Managers' effort incentives are improved by high debt levels only under quite restrictive conditions. These conditions are more plausible when agency problems are due to a managerial propensity to expand size by investing in negative net present value projects. The results also imply that when debt is increased to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow, the accompanying covenants should allow for substantial cash distributions to shareholders even before bondholder claims are satisfied.     

Shareholder Activism, "Voluntary" Restructuring, and Internal Labor Markets

We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder "voice." We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this "slack," activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or "helping" between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to "pay" for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and "flat" pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of management entrenchment.