An integrated tax-subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction

A carbon tax is often cited by economists as an effective instrument to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, but there is little political interest in the United States. In light of this political unpopularity, we develop and examine a net-revenue constrained carbon tax and subsidy program. The optimal revenue constrained tax and subsidy schedule based on our utility maximization model taxes energy sources with high emissions to energy price ratio, and subsidizes sources with low emissions to energy price ratios. This approach may be more palatable than a traditional carbon tax because it can change the relative price of low and high emissions energy sources while providing a mechanism to limit net tax increases and energy price increases. We find that a constrained tax/subsidy program provides welfare gains relative to a no-tax scenario. Welfare gains are estimated to be 1% and 36% of the welfare gains from a Pigouvian tax for the motor fuels industry and electric power industry, respectively. In contrast, subsidies for low-emitting energy sources funded from general tax funds rather than from high-emission energy tax revenues lead to welfare decreases substantially below our proposed tax/subsidy policy approach.     

The amenity value of climate change across different regions in the United States

This article estimates the effect of climatic variables on house prices near ski resorts in different regions in the United States. We find that among the climate variables we test, average winter temperature has the most significant and robust effect where an increase in this climate variable increases house prices near ski resorts at a decreasing rate. At the mean average winter temperature levels, an increase in average winter temperature reduces housing prices for all regions except the Northeast. The consumer surplus from projected average winter temperature changes is negative across all regions and the largest negative effects are in the Midwest and Mountain regions.     

The Effect of Temporary Certified Emission Reductions on Forest Rotations and Carbon Supply

This paper examines the effect of the Clean Development Mechanism regulations that create temporary certified emission reductions on harvesting decisions, land use allocation, and the carbon supply in forest plantations. We develop a model that solves the landowner's harvesting decision when revenues from carbon uptake are included. Rotation intervals and carbon credit supply slightly increase. Fast growing tree species with shorter rotation intervals have relatively more inelastic carbon credit supply curves than slow growing tree species with longer rotations. With moderate carbon prices, most carbon sequestration gains originate from the extensive margin through the expansion of forest land, but approximately 22–35% of total carbon sequestered comes from the intensive margin through an increase in rotation intervals. The contribution to carbon sequestration from the intensive margin is more significant as the carbon price increases. Dans le présent article, nous avons examiné les répercussions que les règles du mécanisme pour un développement propre (MDP), qui délivre des unités de réduction certifiée des émissions temporaire (URCEt), ont sur les décisions de récolte, les changements d’utilisation des terres et l’offre de crédit de carbone dans les plantations forestières. Nous avons élaboré un modèle qui aide les propriétaires fonciers à prendre des décisions de récolte lorsque les revenus tirés de la séquestration du carbone sont pris en compte. Les intervalles de rotation et l’offre de crédit de carbone augmentent légèrement. Les essences à croissance rapide exigeant de courts intervalles de rotation ont des courbes d’offre de crédit de carbone relativement plus inélastiques que les essences à croissance lente exigeant de longs intervalles de rotation. Compte tenu des prix modérés du carbone, la plupart des gains tirés de la séquestration du carbone proviennent de la marge extensive associée à l’expansion des terres forestières, bien que près de 22 à 35 p. 100 de la quantité totale de carbone séquestré proviennent de la marge intensive associée à une augmentation des intervalles de rotation. La participation à la séquestration du carbone à partir de la marge intensive devient plus importante à mesure que le prix du carbone augmente.     

Long‐term versus temporary certified emission reductions in forest carbon sequestration programs*

Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, forest projects can receive returns for carbon sequestration via two crediting instruments: temporary or long‐term certified emission reductions (tCERs or lCERs). This study shows the effect of lCERs on the private owner’s forest rotation intervals decision and carbon credit generation in afforestation and reforestation projects. A credit verification mechanism with a harvest penalty implemented under the lCERs policy distorts the timber harvesting decision and the corresponding carbon credit supply. Two opposing incentives are created by the lCERs mechanism which leads to either longer or shorter rotations compared to the Faustmann rotation, depending on which incentive prevails. Our numerical results show that both lCERs and tCERs seem to have similar impacts on harvesting incentives, but the resulting carbon supply differs among the instruments owing to the credit verification mechanism. The tCERs carbon supply curve is monotonically increasing in the carbon price, while a lCERs carbon supply is non‐monotonic and may have a backward bending region over a range of carbon prices.     

How a race to the bottom can make you fat

This article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the United States through education and health spending. We hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms results in lower business tax revenues and higher public infrastructure spending which crowds out education and health spending leading to an increase in obesity rates. We empirically test this hypothesis. We find that there is significant fiscal competition to attract firms. Next, we show that when business tax revenues are lowered and public infrastructure spending favouring businesses increased, public health and education spending declines and obesity rates significantly increase. Thus, fiscal competition significantly contributes to obesity rates through the education and health spending channel.     

Was It Something I Ate? Implementation of the FDA Seafood HACCP Program

We develop a theoretical model of enforcement and compliance under HACCP regulation and use the FDA's seafood inspection records to examine: (1) if the FDA has targeted its inspections under HACCP regulation; (2) the effects of inspections on compliance with HACCP and plant sanitation standards; and (3) the relationship between compliance with HACCP and preexisting sanitation standards. There is some evidence of targeting based on product risk, but not on past compliance performance. The threat of an inspection increases the likelihood of compliance, but only for sanitation inspections, not for HACCP. HACCP compliance does not improve compliance with sanitation standards.     

Evaluating Temporary Certified Emission Reductions in Reforestation and Afforestation Programs

This article investigates the efficiency of the temporary certified emission reductions (tCERs) system that attempts to internalize the carbon sequestration function of the forest under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. We find that the regulations creating tCERs partially internalize the carbon sequestration function of the forest. The amount of carbon re-released into the atmosphere, due to timber harvest, and sequestered, after the project period, is not internalized in the private landowner’s decision, which induces shorter rotation intervals than socially optimal. Furthermore, the carbon sequestered during the project is over-credited because credits are counted based on accumulated carbon instead of marginally sequestered carbon, which induces longer rotations intervals. Simulation results for the Philippines and Tanzania show that the difference in social welfare between the tCERs system and a socially optimal policy is only about 2% because of the countervailing effect of the inefficiencies on rotation interval choices.