Screening,Competition and the Choice of the Cooperative as an Organisational Form

Cooperatives are distinguished from investor-owned firms by different decision-making processes. A model is developed in which more cumbersome decision making by cooperatives may be compensated for by improved decision making. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives become efficient organisational forms. It is also shown that circumstances exist in which investor-owned firms and cooperatives can coexist in equilibrium. Finally, circumstances are identified in which competition results in a prisoners dilemma which comprises investor-owned firms only. Favourable public policy treatment of cooperatives may prevent this equilibrium outcome from occurring.     

Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative

Globalization, technological developments, and consumer concerns press farmers and food producers to enhance product innovation and to seek more efficient production and distribution structures. These changes in agrifood markets shift the relative importance of the investments by different chain partners. It may therefore be necessary to change the allocation of ownership of essential assets to induce agents to make those investments that generate the chain optimum. This article analyzes the impact of ownership structure on investments in a three-tier supply chain from an incomplete contracting perspective. Circumstances are determined in which a marketing cooperative is the unique first-best ownership structure.     

On the co-existence of spot and contract markets: the delivery requirement as contract externality

A contract between an upstream and a downstream party consistsof a contract price and a delivery requirement. Contract formationentails an externality. It changes the probability distributionof the spot market price by removing high reservation pricebuyers and various sellers from the spot market. The first effectdecreases the expected spot market price when the number ofcontracts is small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellersand additional residual contract demand increase the expectedspot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. It impliesan endogenous upper bound on the number of contracts. Contractprices are positively related to the number of contracts. Finally,additional contract formation reduces the variance of the spotmarket price when the number of contracts is sufficiently large.     

Governance and strategy of entrepreneurial networks: an introduction

This special issue focuses on empirical and theoretical papers that help us to better understand the strategy and governance of entrepreneurial networks, such as franchise chains, alliances, and cooperative networks. The following central themes are covered: (I) Which formal governance mechanisms do entrepreneurial networks use in order to reduce transaction cost/agency cost and to increase strategic value? (II) What is the role of relational governance mechanisms (such as information exchange and social ties) for the performance outcomes in franchise chains and cooperatives? (III) Which alliance strategies do entrepreneurial firms pursue to realize a competitive advantage, and what is the impact of resources and capabilities on performance outcomes of entrepreneurial firms. To address these issues, insights from organizational economics (transaction cost theory, agency theory, signaling theory), strategic management perspectives (resource-based, knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theory), entrepreneurship theory and the relational governance view are used.     

Marketing cooperatives and financial structure: a transaction costs economics analysis

The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favourable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds. This is a serious threat to the survival of a MC in a market where efficient investments are characterised by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production. A MC is predicted to be an efficient organisational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production.     

Selection of workers and firm heterogeneity

A model based on differences between workers regarding their preferences for wage and leisure drives the heterogeneity of firms result. The more industrious workers are driven to small firms due to free riding in large firms. An industry consisting of small and large firms turns out to produce more output than an industry consisting of only large firms. Some comparative statics results are derived with respect to the size of large firms, the productivity difference between firms, and monitoring capabilities.     

An Incomplete Contracting Model of Dual Distribution in Franchising

Dual distribution in franchising is addressed from an incomplete contracting perspective. We explicitly model cooperative (dual distribution) franchising as an organizational form, next to wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and dual distribution franchise systems. Key conclusions of the model are: (1) dual distribution as an efficient governance mechanism does not depend on heterogeneous downstream outlets, and (2) whether dual distribution or some other organizational form is efficient depends on the size of the benefits to dual distribution relative to the parties’ costs of investing.     

Organizational choice and product differentiation

A centralized structure will set higher prices and locate products closer together than a decentralized one. A decentralized organizational structure is chosen because the entry-deterring effect of such a structure outweighs the monopoly effects of a centralized one for sufficiently low entry fee levels.     

Marketing Co‐operatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective

Marketing co‐operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of an MC is a threat to the survival of an MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing. However, an MC may remain an efficient governance structure when the increasing level of asset specificity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of product differentiation.