Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

Experimental Multimarket Contact Inhibits Cooperation

We experimentally examine the effect of multimarket contact utilizing 2 × 2 Prisoner's Dilemma games and a strict discount factor control. We find that cooperation rates when participants play both games simultaneously are lower than or equal to when they play each game separately. This finding suggests that experimental multimarket contact may inhibit cooperation.     

Optimal Control of Pollution Accumulation with Long-Run Average Welfare

This paper considers the problem of pollution accumulation in order to maximize the long-run average welfare functional in environmental economics. We approach the problem by solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in the classical sense, via the viscosity solution method. The optimal policy is shown to exist in a feedback from, and the maximum value is also obtained independently of the initial level of pollution. An equilibrium of the optimal stock of pollution is discussed.     

Rice productivity improvement in Cambodia through the application of technical recommendation in a farmer field school

Innovation in rice (Oryza sativa) productivity improvement is a major goal for rice research. However, many studies have tended to analyse the various factors that affect productivity separately, while farmers invest their scare resources in farm inputs that impact on multiple factors in the real farm. This study assessed the effectiveness of integrated pest management practised during farmer field school (FFS) training in Cambodia on the production efficiencies, yields and profitability of rice farming. In total, 270 FFSs on rice cultivated in the early wet, wet and dry seasons were randomly selected from three provinces in 3 years to analyse the production practices and productivity using six cost-related factors: seed, planting methods, field management, fertilizer use, pesticide application and harvesting. It was found that yields and profits were significantly higher with the technically recommended practices (TRs) than with traditional farmer practices (FPs). However, the reverse was true for production costs due to the overuse of seed and pesticides in FP, neither of which are correlated with yield increase for both FP and TR. Thus, the FFS approach is a knowledge-intensive field management tool that enables the rational use of farm inputs and that is expected to be highly effective for sustainable rice production improvement.     

Investigating Donating Behavior Using Hypothetical Dictator Game Experiments

We conduct dictator game experiments to investigate donating behavior by simultaneously examining the time delay when the donee receives the donation and the individual characteristics of the donor. We show that donations decrease as the time delay rises and that gender, education level, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and utilitarianism affect donations independent of the time delay.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.