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1.
Pham  Van  Woodland  Alan  Caselli  Mauro 《Review of World Economics》2021,157(2):221-269
Review of World Economics - This paper focuses on an unexamined area of trade—the behaviour of heterogeneous intermediate suppliers facing final producers of different ability and pursuing...  相似文献   
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This paper develops a two‐sector model of trade in goods and intermediate tasks that differ in tradability and skill intensity. A skill‐abundant country with high productivity is shown to offshore more unskilled tasks than skilled tasks, without relying on a particular correlation structure between tradability and skill intensity. With putty‐clay technology that allows retraining in the long run, transition from the non‐offshoring to the offshoring equilibrium generates wage and employment effects that switch from negative to positive as tradability declines, with the switches occurring at a higher degree of tradability for skilled tasks. This is consistent with the empirical literature.  相似文献   
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This study endeavors to enhance political marketing literature about the impact of lobbying on firm performance. Our sample is composed of 140 U.S. firms and spans the years 2007–2014 to encompass the 2007–2009 recession and the subsequent recovery period. Our findings indicate that lobbying expenses positively contribute to firm performance. Also, government contracts in both ways, dollar amount and number of government contracts, act as mediators between lobbying expenses and firm performance. In addition, organizational slack moderates the relationship between lobbying expenses and government contracts. The managerial implications suggest that lobbying expenses can be leveraged as a potent tool for firm performance. Firms with larger lobbying efforts acquired both, higher dollar amounts and a greater number of government contracts.  相似文献   
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Open Economies Review - Building upon a Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate model, estimated at a quarterly frequency since 1999 on a broad sample of 57 countries, this paper assesses both the...  相似文献   
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Family income and child outcomes in Canada   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Abstract.  A positive relationship between income and child outcomes has been observed in data from numerous countries. A key question concerns the extent to which this association represents a causal relationship as opposed to unobserved heterogeneity. We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth to implement a series of empirical strategies for estimating the existence and size of the effect of income on three measures of cognition. Our results indicate that the effect of income on these outcomes may well be positive, but that it is likely to be smaller than conventional estimates. JEL Classification: I10  相似文献   
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A hierarchical model of collusion in local public works is presented. A local authority plans to undertake a project, delegating its construction to a construction firm. Both of them know the project's cost. However, the federal government decides whether to subsidize the project without knowing its cost. Therefore, the local authority and the constructor may agree to misreport their private information, in order to benefit from the allocation of federal grants. We show that different collusive behaviors may emerge. Then, we characterize the optimal federal grant policy. Finally, we investigate when constructing (shutting down) useless (valuable) projects is optimal.  相似文献   
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