The reward gap in hierarchical loyalty programmes: how to enhance bottom-tier customers’ loyalty without alienating top-tier customers

ABSTRACT

Reward gap is the difference in the number and nature of rewards allocated to specific customer groups (or tiers) in a hierarchical loyalty programme. Building on the social comparison, equity and attribution theories, and two experiments conducted in a retailing context, we investigate the effect of reward gap size and visibility on both bottom-tier (BT) and top-tier (TT) customers. Findings from Study 1 show that a large reward gap reduces loyalty to the programme in BT customers, while it enhances it in TT customers. These effects are mediated by perceived fairness and perceived control. Findings from Study 2 show that a non-visible large reward gap increases loyalty to the programme in BT customers without affecting it in TT customers. This effect is mediated only by perceived fairness. Altogether, the findings highlight the mechanisms that explain the effect of the reward gap on BT and TT customers’ loyalty to the programme.     

The Impact of Liquidity on Debt Maturity After a Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Gulf Cooperation Council Region

This article contributes to the existent literature on corporate debt maturity by studying a new channel through which firms may mitigate the effects of a major economic downturn such as the 2008 global financial crisis. More specifically, using a sample of 208 listed firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, we find that an increase in firms’ current ratios after the crisis is associated with an increase in long-term financing. We also find that a financially constrained firm can still access long-term financing if its current ratio after the crisis is beyond a specific threshold. Additionally, we highlight the differences in the typical drivers of debt structure between GCC countries and industries.     

Tariff Liberalization and Trade Integration of Emerging Countries

This paper investigates how tariff liberalization has affected exporting at the product‐destination level in emerging countries. We use a highly disaggregated (six‐digit level of the harmonized system—HS—classification) bilateral measure of market access to compare tariffs applied in 1996 and 2006, which includes the timing of the Uruguay Round and episodes of bilateral liberalization. Our econometric estimations consider impacts of tariff cuts on three components of the trade margins: extensive margin of entry (new trade relationships at the product‐destination level), extensive margin of exit (disappearance of existing relationships) and intensive margin of trade (deepening existing relationships). Our main estimates indicate that a reduction of bilateral applied tariffs of 1 percentage point increases the extensive margin of entry by 0.1% and the intensive one by 2.09%, while it reduces the extensive margin of exit by 0.25%.     

Competitive advertising within store flyers: A win–win strategy?

This study investigates the effect of competitive advertising within store flyers on both manufacturers and retailers. Prior research implies that competitive advertising may be detrimental for manufacturers and beneficial for retailers. Findings from an intersubject experiment that uses various familiar and unfamiliar competing brands confirm that store flyers’ competitive advertising improves consumers’ perceptions of the variety of the retailer’s assortment, which has a positive impact on intentions to visit the store and buy. However, increasing the number of competing brands does not harm manufacturers; rather, it enhances recognition of brands, especially for well-known brands. This article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for the design of store flyers.     

An Assessment of Environmentally‐ related Non‐tariff Measures

International trade can affect the environment in different ways. This may justify the introduction of border measures by the importing countries. In addition to various dispositions in the GATT, GATS, TRIPs agreements, as well as in the Agreement on Agriculture, this issue is regulated by the agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on the application of Sanitary and Phyto‐sanitary standards (SPS). Despite these rules, abuse of environmental arguments for protectionist reasons remains an open issue. In order to disentangle protectionism from dispositions justified on the grounds of true environmental concerns, we systematically review notifications of SPS and TBTs by importing countries at the tariff line level. Trade is considered as being potentially affected when an environmental SPS/TBT is notified on grounds of environmental concerns. Affected trade is defined as imports by countries notifying such barriers. Protectionist use of environmental barriers is likely when only a limited number of countries impose an environmental obstacle on the imports of a given product. Considering data for 2001, we find that 88 per cent of the value of world trade is in products potentially affected by such measures, while 39 per cent of the value of world imports is potentially subject to a protectionist use of such measures. Agriculture, the automobile industry, the pharmaceutical industry and many other sectors are concerned.     

The Impact of Regulations on Agricultural Trade: Evidence from the SPS and TBT Agreements

According to World Trade Organization rules, countries may adopt regulations under the Agreements on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). We analyze the structure of these measures in agricultural trade. The inventory approach suggests that European countries have among the lowest coverage ratios of all OECD countries. Using a gravity equation, we also estimate their stringency. Our results suggest that they significantly reduce developing countries' exports to OECD countries, but do not affect trade between OECD members. Furthermore, European imports are more negatively influenced by SPS and TBTs than imports of other OECD countries.