The Effect of Endogenous Regulation on Telecommunications Expansion and Efficiency in Latin America

I examine the effect of reform on telecom performance using a second-generation regulatory framework index and panel data techniques to test how regulatory governance affected sector performance in 22 Latin American countries during the period 1980–1997. Sound regulatory governance in telecommunications has a positive impact on network expansion and efficiency, in both the static and dynamic specifications. Openness of markets to competition and divestment of former state-owned telco operators also contributed positively to better sector performance. The dynamic specification shows that past performance has its own strong effect on present (and perhaps future) performance.     

The Performance of Service Industries in Canada: A Real Value Analysis

The performance of service industries in Canada has been lower than that of good industries over the last four decades, with noticeable exceptions such as for railways and telecommunication carriers. Service industries were less economically (and technically) efficient in that they generated less output value (quantity) per hour worked (level and growth) or per combined unit of labour and capital (multifactor productivity growth) than good industries. The relative output price of services declined slightly over time compared with goods. At the disaggregated level, changing relative output prices were substantial and proved to be an important factor explaining the relative satisfactory economic performance of many service industries despite their low technical performance. Nevertheless, the output share of service industries increased over that period, sustained, mainly, by the growing recourse of all firms to outsourcing of services.     

Technological choices and regulation: the case of the Canadian manufacturing sectors

Abstract The economic environment in which Canadian manufacturing firms operate has changed substantially over the last 40 years. Technological changes, new regulations, deregulation, and exogenous economic shocks all have been important aspects of this economic environment. In this article, we show how to include such changes in the economic environment faced by the firms in a behavioural model that includes the investment decision of the firm under uncertainty. Assumptions regarding the expectation formation process and technology are kept minimal. We estimate the effects of innovations such as the free trade agreement, the foreign investment review agency, and the federal environmental policy on the economic decisions of fifteen Canadian manufacturing sectors. JEL Classification: D24
Choix de technologies et réglementation: le cas des secteurs manufacturiers canadiens Au cours des 40 dernières années, l'environnement économique des firmes manufacturières canadiennes s'est grandement transformé. Que ce soit à cause du changement technologique, de la réglementation, de vagues de déréglementation ou de chocs économiques exogènes, les firmes ont dû s'adapter en modifiant leur technologie. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment prendre en compte les changements de l'environnement économique des firmes dans le cadre d'un modèle décisionnel de la firme en incertitude avec investissement. Les hypothèses concernant la technologie et les anticipations sont aussi générales que possible. Nous estimons l'effet qu'ont eu l'accord de libre échange, l'agence de tamisage des investissements étrangers et la politique environnementale fédérale sur les choix de technologies des firmes de quinze secteurs manufacturiers canadiens.     

Do interventions in foreign exchange markets modify investors' expectations? The experience of Japan between 1992 and 2004

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the Bank of Japan's official interventions on the JPY/USD parity during the period 1992–2004. The novelty of our approach is to combine two recent advances of the empirical literature on foreign exchange interventions: (i) drawing on over-the-counter option prices to characterize more precisely the distribution of market expectations; (ii) redefining interventions in terms of events as they tend to come in clusters. Moreover, in order to deal with the features of the data (small sample size, non-standard distribution), we use bootstrap tests.We show that interventions have a significant impact on the mean expectation (the forward rate). The results are more ambiguous for variance. Additionally, we find that the effect of interventions on skewness is significant, robust to different definitions of skewness, and consistent with the direction of interventions. On the contrary, our results clearly show that kurtosis is not affected by interventions. We finally show that: (i) coordination increases effectiveness of interventions; (ii) results are not altered when controlling for other economic and political news.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

The law of one price: a test based on prices for selected inputs in New Zealand agriculture

The law of one price (LOOP) is an essential foundation of both the pure theory of trade and monetary theory. Strictly speaking, the law relates to prices of individual commodities. However, empirical tests of LOOP have often relied on aggregated data. In this paper, a model is derived and estimated using price data for 15 selected inputs in New Zealand agriculture. The results offer no support for the LOOP in the short run, and the results for the long run are mixed. It may be inappropriate, therefore, to assume that the LOOP holds generally in modelling exercises, particularly when models are used for policy purposes.     

International health law and consumer autonomy

Today, international health law and international consumer law are developing in the same direction and with much interaction. But the developments are not uniform. As international health law takes consumer protection into account, it tends to increase the gap between a Western international law and a Third World international law, and to emphasize the negative harmonization approach towards international health protection.Another problem concerns the unification of the rules of international health law and those of international consumer law. This problem is particularly difficult to solve, as the rules of international consumer law themselves are still far from being unified.

---

Internationales Gesundheitsrecht und Verbraucherautonomie

Zusammenfassung Internationales Gesundheitsrecht und internationales Verbraucherrecht entwickeln sich heute in gleicher Richtung, obwohl sie anderen Quellen entspringen. Die wechselseitige Durchdringung nimmt zu, auch wenn die Enwicklung nicht einheitlich vor sich geht. Je mehr das internationale Gesundheitsrecht den Verbraucherschutz in sich aufnimmt, destomehr trennt es sich in ein Recht für entwickelte Staaten und ein solches für Dritte Welt-Länder. Ein vorwiegend negativ-abwehrender Zugang herrscht vor.Ein anderes Problem beinhaltet die Harmonisierung der Regeln des internationalen Gesundheits- und des internationalen Verbraucherrechts. Dies ist schon deshalb schwer erreichbar, weil das Verbraucherrecht selbst nicht einheitlich vorgeht. Die Probleme verschärfen sich, wenn man — ohne eine internationale Verbraucherinstitution wie die WHO — eine gemeinsame positive Gesundheitspolitik für Verbraucher erreichen will.

---

---

Michel Bélanger teaches health law at the U.F.R. de Droit Public et Science Politique, Université de Bordeaux I, Avenue Léon Duguit, F 33604 Pessac, France.