Graduate Agribusiness Management Programs: Too Many and Too Cheap

Nearly two dozen graduate programs in agribusiness management have emerged in the last decade. All are at public universities. This pattern raises several questions: Why have private universities stayed out of this market? Is this trend good for our students? Who is benefiting the most from this trend? In this paper, I present some hypotheses regarding the answers to these questions.     

The Globalization of Business Schools: Curriculum and Pedagogical Issues

In this article we explore the connection between learning goals, cognitive skill development, and pedagogical strategies. We identify cognitive skills that are important to students of international business, and link them to the pedagogical strategies that support them. The characteristics that impact the effectiveness of international business pedagogy are described. Finally, three university programs are used to illustrate the connection between explicit learning goals, pedagogy, and cognitive skill development.     

Testing errors, supplier segregation, and food safety

Diagnostic tests provide valuable information to buyers about credence attributes such as food safety and GMO content. Errors in testing, however, can mislead buyers and lead to problems such as adverse selection. The ability to segregate suppliers who can deliver safe food from suppliers who cannot depends on the accuracy of the test procedure. In this article we examine the effect of test sensitivity, specificity, and sampling error on the ability to segregate safe and unsafe suppliers. We find that there is a maximum level of error below which unsafe suppliers are deterred from accepting a utility maximizing buyer's bid price. The maximum error depends on the probability that a supplier's production is unsafe and the cost of producing an unsafe lot, among other things. Understanding this relationship makes it possible to design contracts and government regulations that discourage unsafe suppliers from trading.     

Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety

Buyers have imperfect information about the food safety efforts exerted by suppliers. To gather information about safety, buyers often employ sampling inspection. Sampling inspection exhibits sampling error so some unsafe product passes inspection and some safe product does not. This uncertainty influences buyer and supplier behavior. In this article, I use a principal–agent model to examine how sampling inspection policies influence food safety. I use the model to examine the sampling inspection policies in the 1996 Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point Act. I conclude that the regulation of sampling inspection procedures is an effective tool for policy makers who wish to improve food safety.