A MODEL OF BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION*

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and “lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model.     

Ethics from the top: top management and ethical business

Codes of ethics and conduct typically demand the highest standard of ethical behaviour from every single employee. This implies a democratic or lobbyist understanding of ethics in business. The contrasting view would argue that business ethics is an elitist undertaking that can only be instigated from the top, by managing directors or owner managers. This article looks at three types of ethical businesses, three types of approaches to ethical problem-solving, and three possible incentives for ethical business to see which of the above is more convincing. It will be argued that the impulse for value-driven business has to come from the top. Only top management and owner managers have the opportunity to foster major change in business practice.     

Provincial Motor Vehicle Taxation in Indonesia

Vehicle-based taxes are collected by provincial governments in Indonesia and constitute their most important source of locally collected revenue. This paper evaluates the structure and revenue performance of the two vehicle-based taxes–-the vehicle registration tax and the vehicle transfer tax–-focusing in particular on their allocative efficiency. This is evaluated in terms of their potential to meet road maintenance resource requirements, and the study finds that objectives other than allocative efficiency have determined the structure of the two taxes.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays

We propose and implement a new method to estimate the relation between R&D investments and the uncertainty of future benefits from those investments. The empirical analysis compares the relative contributions of current investments in R&D and PP&E to future earnings variability using a sample of roughly 50,000 firm-year observations from 1972–1997. Evidence is strongly consistent with the hypothesis that R&D investments generate future benefits that are far more uncertain than benefits from investments in PP&E. Our results should help the current discussion on accounting for R&D and the methodology might be helpful in standard setting in other contexts as well.     

The Effect of the Hedge Horizon on Optimal Hedge Size and Effectiveness When Prices are Cointegrated

This study compares two alternative regression specifications for sizing hedge positions and measuring hedge effectiveness: a simple regression on price changes and an error correction model (ECM). We show that, when the prices of the hedged item and the hedging instrument are cointegrated, both specifications yield similar results which depend on the hedge horizon (i.e., the time frame for measuring price changes). In particular, the estimated hedge ratio and regression R² will both be small when price changes are measured over short intervals, but as the hedge horizon is lengthened both measures will converge toward one. These results imply that, when prices are cointegrated, a longer hedge horizon will yield an optimal hedge ratio closer to one, while at the same time enhancing the ability to qualify for hedge accounting. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 32:837–876, 2012     

The Tunisia Wheat Market in the Context of World Price Volatility: A Stochastic Partial Equilibrium Approach

Food security is a key objective of agricultural and food policy in Tunisia. The 2007–2008 food crisis highlighted the negative impacts of price volatility on international markets both in terms of food insecurity and budget exposure. Tunisian food subsidy expenditures ranged from $180 million to $710 million in 2006–2010, so volatile world prices meant volatile subsidy costs. Moreover, cereal production in Tunisia still has much instability due to climate conditions, which also influences imports and, consequently, subsidy expenditures. This study applies a structural model to conduct stochastic analyses of trade and policy impacts on food security and budget expenditures in the Tunisian wheat market. The methodology disaggregates durum wheat and soft wheat markets and generates projections of import prices of durum wheat and soft wheat, using projections of world prices provided by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute at University of Missouri (FAPRI-MU). The key innovation is the generated stochastic analyses of subsidy costs based on stochastic world price projections and stochastic domestic wheat yields based on historic yield variances. The analysis highlights the sensitivity of subsidy costs to world prices, volumes imported and domestic production, so that alternative policy tools can be considered.