Cointegration and control: Assessing the impact of events using time series data

Control groups can provide counterfactual evidence for assessing the impact of an event or policy change on a target variable. We argue that fitting a multivariate time series model offers potential gains over a direct comparison between the target and a weighted average of controls. More importantly, it highlights the assumptions underlying methods such as difference in differences and synthetic control, suggesting ways to test these assumptions. Gains from simple and transparent time series models are analysed using examples from the literature, including the California smoking law of 1989 and German reunification. We argue that selecting controls using a time series strategy is preferable to existing data‐driven regression methods.     

Family businesses and non-family equity: literature review and avenues for future research

Family firms commonly prefer internal funding and retention of control. Under certain circumstances, however, equity investments from outside the family can be a relevant alternative source of capital. To facilitate further knowledge about the interaction of family-owned businesses and external equity investors, the present work reviews 42 studies and suggests possible directions for future research. Results reveal that extant studies focus mainly on five key areas—corporate finance, contract design and collaboration, succession and exit route, strategy and performance, and corporate governance. Moreover, the paper discusses various gaps in the extant work and presents three opportunities for future research in a detailed manner. These include a comparison of different types of investors in the context of family-owned businesses, an investigation of minority investor exits from family firms, and an analysis of the impact of investors on family firm boards. All in all, the findings can guide the future development of this emerging field of research and have implications for theory and practice.     

When Organizational Justice Matters for Affective Merger Commitment

We investigate when organizational justice matters to employees’ commitment in the postacquisition process after a company is taken over in a cross‐border acquisition. Overwhelming evidence from the literature suggests that employees who are treated fairly during acquisitions are more committed to their new firms. We extend this finding by dividing organizational justice into three subdimensions: informational justice, interpersonal justice, and procedural justice. We find evidence that procedural justice is an important antecedent of affective merger commitment at an early stage of the integration period, while informational justice becomes important at a later stage. Further analysis on heterogeneity between the target firm's employees and the bidder firm's employees reveals that, immediately after the acquisition, target firm's employees value knowing where they will be at the new firm (procedural justice), while bidder firm employees are more concerned about communication and transparency (informational justice). Our results point to the importance of organizational justice in a cross‐border merger and acquisition (M&A) setting and the need for a separate study of issues related to bidder firms and target firms. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the Degree of Official Financing Matter?

Using a new data set for 41 German non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), we analyse the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries in a Tobit regression framework. By identifying for each NGO the degree of official financing, we address the largely unresolved issue of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that German NGOs are more active in poorer countries, while they do not complement official aid by working under difficult local conditions. Beyond a certain threshold, rising financial dependence weakens their poverty orientation and provides an incentive to engage in ‘easier’ environments. In addition, we find that the NGOs follow the state as well as NGO peers when allocating aid. This herding behaviour is, however, hardly affected by the degree of official financing.     

The role of the private and public sector in human capital formation

While there are strong equity and efficiency reasons for subsidizing education in developing countries, the prevailing dominance of governments in the financing and provision of educational services can be questioned. There is some evidence supporting the conclusion that a partial cost recovery through user fees may reduce the rationing of services which is still a pressing problem in many low-income countries, and that private providers tend to be more cost-efficient than their public counterparts.     

EU agriculture: Reduced protection from exchange rate instability

In the past, the protection of agriculture in the EU from exchange rate instability was accomplished at the cost of confusing regulations, welfare losses and the discrimination of other sectors. Will the 1993 reform of the Agri-Monetary System, combined with wide 15% European Monetary System margins and the recent GATT agreement, lead to more efficiency in European agriculture?     

Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries

Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives, and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. At the same time, it is open to question whether new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) are more altruistic and provide better targeted aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the AidData initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that, on average, new donors care less for recipient need than old donors. New and old donors behave similarly in several respects, however. They disregard merit by not taking the level of corruption in recipient countries into account. Concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overblown for both groups.     

CONSERVING TROPICAL RAIN FORESTS IN INDONESIA: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

The present paper provides a numerical general equilibrium assessment of policies to reduce tropical deforestation in Indonesia. Two groups of policy measures are examined: (i) forestry policies as a means to internalise the local externalities of deforestation; (ii) international measures to address the global dimension of the problem. Given the relatively short rotation periods and the high harvesting intensity in the forestry sector, it is concluded that among the forestry policies an increase in the minimum harvest age is the best solution from an ecological point of view, because it tackles both problems simultaneously. At the global level, import restrictions, for Indonesian wood products are ecologically ineffective and place considerable costs on the Indonesian economy, whereas compensation payments can compensate for the losses of forest conservation, if the money is invested in the creation of new employment opportunities.     

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve both incentive and selection purposes. If harder working agents respond less to intensified effort incentives, we find that the principal puts less emphasis on individual performance pay when selection becomes more important. Thus, we provide a possible explanation as to why, in practice, individual performance pay is less prevalent than promotion‐based incentives.