双轨制:中国经济与世界接轨的有效途径

在谈到中国在世界经济的位置时,一个重要的问题是中国的宏观经济管理如何与世界接轨,在这里,我想强调的是,中国可以采取一种双轨制的办法来管理宏观经济,并逐步融入世界经济.     

The Macroeconomic Role of Fiscal Policy

This article examines the new consensus that fiscal policy shouldhave no macroeconomic role in ‘flexible inflation targeting’regimes. There is little basis for this presumption. Fiscalpolicy remains important in setting the policy mix and in managingshocks and imbalances. The credibility of an inflation-targetingregime should be enhanced rather than reduced if fiscal policyplays its proper role. It is true, nevertheless, that the costsof focusing fiscal policy narrowly on public-sector concernsmay not be very great, most of the time. However, when interestrates cannot be used, the role of fiscal policy must be different.With interest rates at their lower bound of zero, there is noplausible alternative. For asymmetric shocks and adjustmentsin EMU, fiscal policy needs, ideally, to substitute for theinterest-rate policy reaction function of the consensus, butthe difficulties are very great. We suggest a policy focus onreal exchange rates as a way of resolving some of the dilemmas.There is a serious danger that orthodox views about fiscal policy,drawn from the consensus, will be inappropriately applied, especiallyin Europe. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: christopher.allsopp{at}new.ox.ac.uk; david.vines{at}economics.oxford.ac.uk     

The assessment: macroeconomic policy after EMU

In this paper we discuss the emergence of the new European macroeconomicstructure within EMU. We focus on three important elements:the wage-fixing authorities in each country, the fiscal authoritiesin each country, and the single European Central Bank (ECB).We identify serious problems which might arise in coordinatingboth the wage-setters and the fiscal authorities, and arguethat these problems could be exacerbated if the ECB conductsmonetary policy inappropriately. In the light of this we providerecommendations for the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB.The paper also briefly discusses financial stability issuesand the interaction between the countries in EMU and the restof the world.     

The assessment: economics of transition in eastern and central Europe

This Assessment provides an overview of the stylized facts andthe underlying economic issues involved in transition, witha focus on the more successful reforming countries. Microeconomic,macroeconomic, and institutional factors interact. Particularemphasis is given to the initial output falls at the start ofreform, where it is suggested that a generalized price-raisingresponse by state enterprises to monetary tightness, liberalization,and devaluation was one of the main culprits. Trade liberalizationhas proved to be an extremely important and successful aspectof the strategies followed, but there are increasing dilemmasover exchange-rate policy at both the micro- and macroeconomiclevels. A partial solution is further progress with institutionaland, especially, banking-sector reform, but the policy conflictswill remain in an increasingly open and integrated internationalenvironment.     

The assessment: real interest rates

The assessment attempts to provide a broad explanation of thepost-war pattern of real interest rates, drawing on the theoreticaland empirical papers in this issue of the >Oxford Review. Itis argued that the concept of the 'neutral' rate of interest,at which the economy grows at its productive potential withoutchanges in the inflation rate, provides a helpful frameworkfor understanding these developments. The neutral rate providesa bridge between, on the one hand, the fundamental determinantsof real returns, as suggested by models of economic growth and,on the other hand, the functioning of asset markets and theoperating procedures of central banks. The change in policystance towards tighter money at the beginning of the 1980s isseen as having had long-lasting effects, especially when accountis taken of the fiscal stance.     

The Pivotal Role of the ECB in the New Europe

With the successful launch of EMU at the beginning of January 1999, the key question is how well the new grouping of 11 countries – Euroland – will perform macroeconomically. Strains and difficulties between countries appear solvable if the context is a healthy growing Europe, but are more dangerous if the group as a whole performs badly. In this article Christopher Allsopp and David Vines argue that the European Central Bank has a pivotal role. This is not just for the obvious reason, enshrined in the Treaty, that the independent Bank is charged with ensuring price stability. Beyond that, the ECB will necessarily be the main co-ordinating institution for macroeconomic policy. The single monetary authority interacts, for good or ill, with eleven national governments, eleven fiscal authorities and eleven national labour markets. The game is rigged in an unfamiliar way.     

The assessment: macroeconomic policy

This paper describes the emerging consensus about the 'reactionfunction' approach to macroeconomic policy. The first sectionof the paper describes the historical emergence of this consensus,as a synthesis of pre-Keynesian, Keynesian, and monetarist ideas.The theoretical part of the paper presents the basic frameworkof the approach and explains a number of extensions, including:finding the optimal reaction function, avoiding the problemof inflation bias, the relevance of the Taylor rule, forward-lookingexpectations, extensions to the open economy, and the interconnectionsbetween monetary and fiscal policy. The later parts of the papercontain a detailed discussion of some of the practical and institutionalissues involved in the implementation of this new framework.     

The Assessment: EMU, Four Years On

This paper reviews the functioning of the Economic and MonetaryUnion over the first 4 years of its existence. Monetary policyis viewed as having been of the ‘inflation-targeting’type, but with a tendency towards delay and conservatism inadjustment, which may also reflect over-optimistic output growthforecasts. The resulting pressure on the Stability and GrowthPact (SGP) illustrates the weakness in the ‘consensusview’ of the harmonious interaction of monetary, fiscal,and supply-side policies, which requires policy in all threeareas to be ‘correct’. In discussing reform of theSGP, a looser but still constraining form of fiscal agreementis advocated. The supply-side and balance-of-payments issuesinvolved in inter-country adjustment also interact importantlywith the SGP and are identified as key areas of difficulty ina still ‘immature’ monetary union, with separatelabour-market structures. Here the mechanisms for coordinationare more or less absent.     

Two Experiments to Test a Model of Herd Behaviour

We carry out two experiments to test a model of herd behaviour based on the work of Banerjee (Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII, 797–817, 1992). He shows that herding occurs as a result of people observing the actions of others and using this information in their own decision rule. In our experiments herding does not occur as frequently as Banerjee predicts. Contrary to his results, the subjects' behaviour appears to depend on the probabilities of receiving a signal and of this signal being correct. Furthermore, Banerjee finds that the pattern of decision making over a number of rounds of the game is volatile whereas we find that decision making is volatilewithin rounds.     

Monetary and Fiscal Stabilization of Demand Shocks Within Europe

This paper examines alternative macroeconomic stabilization rules for demand shocks, for a single open economy, and for an integrated European region. These questions are tackled in two ways. First a very simple macroeconomic model is used to focus on intercountry interconnections. Then the effects of shocks are simulated using the McKibbin Sachs MSG2 global economic model. The theoretical model analyzes just how much larger the disturbances caused by asymmetric shocks might be in a European Monetary Union, as compared with outcomes under floating exchange rates, especially (1) if rigid central monitoring and discipline of the fiscal policy prevents the full operation of the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers within individual European countries, and (2) if European monetary policy does not concern itself with fully European objectives. Simulations with the MSG2 model bear out the significance of these risks. They show that a demand shock like GEMU can have strongly negative effects on output in other European countries if either interest rates are raised to counter the demand shock in the originating country, or if, for some reason, fiscal stabilization is not allowed to be as strong as the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers.