Mortality risks,education and child labor

In this paper, we investigate the role of young adult mortality on child labor and educational decisions. We argue that mortality risks are a major source of risks in returns to education in developing countries. We show that, in the absence of appropriate insurance mechanisms, the level of child labor is inefficient, but it can be too high or too low. It is too high when parents are not very altruistic and anticipate positive transfers from their children in the future. Uncertain returns to education, endogenous mortality or imperfect capital markets unambiguously increase child labor. When the level of child labor is inefficiently high, we also show that a cash transfer conditional on child's schooling can always restore efficiency regarding child labor.     

Investment coordination and demand complementarities

Summary. This paper establishes necessary conditions for demand complementarity to imply investment coordination failure and explores the welfare implications of coordinated investment. Our main results caution against demand complementarities as a motive for investment coordination. We find that: 1) generally, a strict notion of complementarity (Hicks) is necessary for the existence of an investment coordination problem and 2) that when the problem does exist, coordination lowers social welfare without countervailing sectoral asymmetries. Received: June 19, 1996; revised version: December 5, 1997     

Enforcement in informal saving groups

Informal groups cannot rely on external enforcement to insure that members abide by their obligations. It is generally assumed that these problems are solved by ‘social sanctions’ and reputational effects. The present paper focuses on roscas, one of the most commonly found informal financial institutions in the developing world. We first show that, in the absence of an external (social) sanctioning mechanism, roscas are never sustainable, even if the defecting member is excluded from all future roscas. We then argue that the organizational structure of the rosca itself can be designed so as to address enforcement issues. The implications of our analysis are consistent with first-hand evidence from rosca groups in a Kenyan slum.     

Are labels effective against child labor?

In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing a label certifying the absence of child labor in the export production of the South. When most eligible producers in the South can obtain the label, its impact is considerably reduced by a displacement effect whereby adult workers replace children in the export sector while children replace adults in the domestic sector. The label is then unable to create a price differential in the South between goods produced under the label and those produced without it.When only a small fraction of eligible producers have access to the label, the South exports both labeled and unlabeled goods to the North. In this case, labeled producers generally gain while those without a label generally loose from the introduction of the label. Ex ante welfare may fall in the South if the probability of getting a label when one qualifies is small. The impact on child labor is in general ambiguous.     

Wealth inequality and efficiency in the Commons, part II: the regulated case

Does more inequality lead to more efficiency in the managementof common property resources? To answer this question, an attemptis made to develop relevant theoretical models and to articulatethem with empirical evidence drawn mainly from social sciencestudies. The paper is divided into two parts. In this, the secondpart, it is shown that inequality tends to amplify the distributiveeffects of regulation when the latter is carried out throughthe use of second best instruments. As a resuh efficiency gainsfrom regulation must decrease as inequality increases, for allusers to gain from such regulation.