Foreign competition and the durability of US firm investments

How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? We study if firms have an incentive to shift investments toward more short‐term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Based on a stylized firm investment model, we derive a within‐firm estimator using variation across investments with different durabilities. Exploiting the Chinese World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, we estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of US firm investments. Firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures toward investments with a shorter durability. This effect is larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.     

Unbiased estimation of expected return using CAPM

Estimation of expected return is required for many financial decisions. For example, an estimate for cost of capital is required for capital budgeting and cost of equity estimates are needed for performance evaluation based on measures such as EVA. Estimates for expected return are often based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which states that expected excess return (expected return minus the risk-free rate) is equal to the asset's sensitivity to the world market portfolio (β) times the risk premium on the “world market portfolio” (the market risk premium). Since the world market portfolio, by definition, contains all assets in the world, it is not observable. As a result, an estimate for expected return is commonly obtained by taking an estimate for β based on some index (as a proxy for the world market portfolio) and an estimate for the market risk premium based on a potentially different index and multiplying them together. In this paper, it is shown that this results in a biased estimate for expected return. This is undesirable since biased estimates lead to misallocation of funds and biased performance measures. It is also shown in this paper that the straightforward procedure suggested by Fama and MacBeth [J. Financ. Econ. 1 (1974) 43] results in an unbiased estimate for expected return. Further from the analysis done, it follows that, for an unbiased estimate, it does not matter what proxy is used, as long as it is used correctly an unbiased estimate for expected return results.     

EU Enlargement and Trade Integration: Lessons from a Gravity Model

The authors estimate gravity models using a large panel of bilateral trade flows across 61 countries between 1980 and 2003, which are applied as a benchmark for the integration of Central and South Eastern European countries with the euro area. They show that a careful examination of the fixed effects of the model is crucial for the proper interpretation of the results. The results suggest that trade integration between most new EU member states and the euro area is already relatively advanced, while the remaining Central and Eastern European countries have significant scope to strengthen trade links with the euro area.     

Eastern European Public Opinion on Economic Issues:

Abstract Survey data on Eastern Europe is investigated with respect to two major questions: How do people view the creation of a market economy and how do they assess the speed of economic transformation and privatization. These questions are analyzed by looking at the development over 1990 to 1992 and by performing regressions with a number of demographic variables as regressors. Some findings are that the opposition to the creation of a market economy is increasing over time, that in Hungary and Poland people are quite satisfied with the speed of transformation as compared to Czechs and Slovaks, that the Polish are divided over the speed of privatization, and that the relationship between the speed of transformation and privatization is not considered to be very tight by the respondents.     

A note on measuring political participation in comparative research

This article presents an application of Prezeworski and Teune's so-called “identity-equivalence method” to a large set of indicators of political participation. By relaxing commonly held assumptions about necessary distinctions among types of participation, it is found that the distinction between “conventional” and “unconventional” modes of participation is unnecessary, while the distinction between “government” and “nongovernment” has some merit. The findings also lend further support to the claims of Prezeworski and Teune that the identity-equivalence method is preferable to the identical indicator method.     

On Conditional Density Estimation

With the aim of mitigating the possible problem of negativity in the estimation of the conditional density function, we introduce a so-called re-weighted Nadaraya-Watson (RNW) estimator. The proposed RNW estimator is constructed by a slight modification of the well-known Nadaraya-Watson smoother. With a detailed asymptotic analysis, we demonstrate that the RNW smoother preserves the superior large-sample bias property of the local linear smoother of the conditional density recently proposed in the literature. As a matter of independent statistical interest, the limit distribution of the RNW estimator is also derived.     

Contest Theory and Sport

Contrary to most sports fans economists tend to view tournamentsnot only as a mechanism to identify the most able and most talentedathlete(s) but also as an instrument to increase the athletes'effort levels by designing an adequate compensation system thattakes into account the specificities of the contest under consideration.The paper proceeds in two different steps: First, it reviewsthe available evidence on sports contests and identifies somepuzzles that have not yet been resolved in the literature (theempirical separation of selection and incentive effects andthe impact of incentive pay in team settings). Second, it addressesthese puzzles and offers some new evidence supporting the basicassumptions offered by economic theory.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.