The welfare effects of disclosure under cognitive dissonance

Atlantic Economic Journal -     

Why do diners tip: rule-of-thumb or valuation of service?

When diners decide how much to tip, is the decision based on social convention or on conscientious appraisal of server productivity? Previous researchers in economics and social psychology are generally inconclusive on this question. A common finding in the literature is that tip size and service quality are unrelated, a result usually obtained from OLS regressions. OLS is only appropriate if service quality is exogenous. It is argued that service quality is very likely endogenous in any regression of tip size; good quality encourages good tips, but server expectations of good tips encourage good quality. This simultaneity is accounted for by jointly estimating percentage tips and customer rankings of service quality on a sample of 247 diners in a Central Minnesota restaurant. Included are explanatory variables consistent with both the social psychology and economic views of tipping. In contrast to previous studies, it is found that service quality significantly affects tip size and when servers expect higher tips, customers rank service quality higher. Also it is found that patronage frequency and coupon redemption have no effect on percentage tips, but server gender influences quality significantly. It is concluded that the results are generally supportive of an economic hypothesis of tipping.     

The measurement of pay discrimination between job assignments

The traditional Becker/Arrow model of taste discrimination in pay depicts majority and minority labour as perfectly substitutable, implying that all workers perform precisely the same job assignment and have the same qualifications. The model is thus only appropriate for determining whether ceteris paribus pay differences between white workers and non-white workers, for example, performing job assignment A are attributable to prejudice (‘within-assignment discrimination’). The model is inappropriate for determining whether ceteris paribus pay differences between white workers in assignment A and non-white workers in assignment B reflect prejudice (‘cross-assignment discrimination’). We extend the traditional model to allow for cross-assignment discrimination and we propose an empirical methodology for its estimation. In so doing we address two broad questions: (1) Do predictions about cross-assignment discrimination vary with the form of the production function?; and (2) How can one estimate such discrimination when there is no common measure of productivity? We address the first question by deriving a measure of cross-assignment discrimination for four different production functions—Generalized Leontief, Quadratic, CES, and Cobb-Douglas. The Generalized Leontief provides the most general results, although closed form solutions are not possible. Closed form solutions are obtainable from the other three functions, but only under restrictive assumptions. There are two main findings. First, most predictions are generally robust across functional forms. Second, cross-assignment discrimination depends upon productivity and labour supply differences between the two worker groups, labour market structure, and the interaction between relative group productivity and prejudice. We address the second question by outlining, for future exploration, a two-stage regression methodology in which a standardised (i.e. common) measure of productivity is estimated separately for each occupation. This measure is then incorporated as a right-hand-side explanatory variable in a second-stage, all-occupation regression designed to estimate cross-assignment discrimination. We discuss the proposed methodology with reference to a valuable and interesting test case: The market for professional sports players.     

Economics and Restaurant Gratuities: Determining Tip Rates

Abstract IS tipping in restaurants simply a social norm where people tip on the basis of some rule of thumb (15% of bill size for example)? Using evidence gathered from surveys of nearly 700 diners in 7 Minnesota restaurants, it is argued that tipping is both a social norm and a means of rewarding good service. Survey evidence suggests that diners use rules of thumb as starting points and then vary gratuities on the basis of service just received, expected future service, whether they dine alone or with a group, alcohol consumption and location of the restaurant. Tipping may be viewed as a game played indirectly between diners in which each diner contemplates tipping, or not tipping, based on expectations of future service and the tipping behavior of other diners. Tipping is commonplace as long as people expect better service when they tip more and the expected payoff to tipping rises when more people tip, but rare otherwise. Neo-classical economics is quite successful in predicting tip size as long as diners view tipping as a pecuniary cost of buying service.     

Aging and Migration: Micro and Macro Evidence from China

Post-reform China has been experiencing two major demographic changes: an increasingly aging population and an extraordinary surge of rural-urban migrants. The question we ask is: are these two demographic changes related? If yes, then, how? The standard view in the migration literature is that the older the migrant, the lower the likelihood of migration. This paper proposes a simple theory of temporary migration for unskilled labor to fit the context of China. Motivated by our model, we then use both cross-sectional micro data and panel macro data to examine the potential impacts of aging on migration. We find that shifts in China’s age distribution have generated significant changes in the country’s migration patterns: migration will shift to closer provinces (probably switching from interprovincial migration to intra-provincial migration) and will concentrate to a few destination provinces.     

Measuring immigration's effects on labor demand: A reexamination of the Mariel Boatlift

Why do immigration shocks tend to have benign effects on native wages? One reason is that immigrants as consumers contribute to the demand for their services. We model an economy where workers spend their wages on a locally produced good, then test it via a reexamination of the 1980 “Mariel Boatlift” using Wacziarg's Channel Transmission methodology. Current Population Survey data on workers in 9 different retail labor markets and Survey of Buying Power data on retail spending by consumers in Miami and four comparison cities are used. We find strong evidence that the Mariel Boatlift augmented labor demand.