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We present a model of a risk-averse exporting firm subject to liquidity constraints. We show that preferences and expectations become important for optimum export and hedging decisions. Only firms that have sufficient financial resources can fully materialize gains from trade. 相似文献
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In the present paper we study the equilibrium interaction through which the interbank market is related to the public lending and borrowing market. It turns out that this interaction is affected by the transparency in the interbank market. Interbank market transparency is modeled by means of more informative signals about future interbank rates. We find that more transparency might increase or decrease the volume of bank intermediated loans in the public market. In particular, the impact of more transparency on the volume of loans depends on the curvature of the marginal cost function of the banking firm. Furthermore, we find that expected profits of the bank are higher when the interbank market is more transparent. 相似文献
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The paper considers a risk-averse international firm which sells its output in either the domestic or the foreign market. The firm possesses export flexibility, and so it can choose between the domestic and export markets after considering the foreign exchange rate. It is shown that a separation property holds if the proper hedging instrument is used: the firm's production depends on market prices and technology and does not depend on its attitude towards risk nor on its expectations. A full-hedge proposition is derived. 相似文献
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We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling
foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the
effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the
consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However,
if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better
off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off. 相似文献
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Udo Broll Soumyatanu Mukherjee Rudra Sensarma 《Scottish journal of political economy》2020,67(1):126-136
This note empirically analyses how exchange rate fluctuations affects firms’ optimal production and exporting decisions. A firm’s elasticity of risk aversion determines the direction of the impact of exchange rate risk on exports. Based on a flexible utility function that incorporates all possible risk preferences, a unique structurally estimable equation is derived. Quantile regression method is used to estimate this equation and compute the risk aversion elasticities for a panel of Indian firms. This approach allows us to demonstrate how characteristics of exporters at the intensive margin varies with the level of elasticities across the conditional exchange rate distribution. 相似文献
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We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports. 相似文献
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We show that a monopolistic final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology
if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable
under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under the
former situation. We also show that licensing by the monopolist is profitable under both quantity and price competition, and
the incentive for licensing is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Our qualitative results hold
even with decentralized unions.
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In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies
but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases
welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is
moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated
or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our
analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently
lower than the entrant’s marginal cost. 相似文献