Negative nominal interest rates: Three ways to overcome the zero lower bound

The paper considers three methods for eliminating the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and thus for restoring symmetry to the domain over which the Central Bank can vary its official policy rate. They are: (1) abolishing currency (which would also be a useful crime-fighting measure); (2) paying negative interest on currency by taxing currency; and (3) decoupling the numéraire from the currency/medium of exchange/means of payment and introducing an exchange rate between the numéraire and the currency; this exchange rate can be set over time to achieve a forward discount (expected depreciation) of the currency vis-à-vis the numéraire when the nominal interest rate in terms of the numéraire is set at a negative level for monetary policy purposes.     

A portfolio approach to a cross-sectoral and cross-national investment strategy in transition economies

This paper takes a systematic look at the portfolio choice problem faced by Investment Banks or Funds investing in transition economies. We relate the performance of projects in the transition economies to the broader macroeconomic and international environments, which affect the project through their input-output structures and financial balance sheets. Among the macroeconomic determinanst of enterprise behaviour are productivity growth, real wage growth, movements in the international terms of trade, shocks to the relative price of traded and non-traded goods, domestic and foreign interest rates, currency depreciation and the rate of inflaction. We evaluate the attractiveness of alternative investment strategies and provisioning rules from the perspective of portfoio theory.     

Overcoming the zero bound on nominal interest rates: Gesell’s currency carry tax vs. Eisler’s parallel virtual currency

Despite the zero lower bound on the short nominal interest rate in Japan having become a binding constraint, conventional monetary policy in Japan, in the form of generalised open market purchases of government securities of all maturities, has never been pushed to the limit where all outstanding government debt and all current and anticipated future government deficits are (or are confidently expected to be) monetised. Open market purchases of private securities can create serious governance problems. Two ways of overcoming the zero lower bound constraint have been proposed. The first is Gesell’s carry tax on currency. The second is Eisler’s proposal for the unbundling of the medium of exchange/means of payment function and the numéraire function of money through the creation of a parallel virtual currency. This raises the fundamental issue of who chooses or what determines the numéraire used in private wage and price contracts—an issue that is either not addressed in the literature or addressed incorrectly. On balance, Gesell’s proposal appears to be the more robust of the two.     

Patching up the Pact

The paper considers the implications for the EU accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe of the fiscal‐financial constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty. Our findings apply also to those current EU members whose initial conditions (e.g., infrastructure and progress in state pension reform) or other structural characteristics (e.g., demographic structure, growth potential, Balassa‐Samuelson equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation) differ significantly from the EU average. We find the existing criteria to be seriously flawed and propose an alternative rule, the Permanent Balance Rule, based on a strong form of tax smoothing.     

‘Crowding out’ and the effectiveness of fiscal policy

‘Crowding out’ of private economic activity by public economic activity is a multidimensional concept. A taxonomy is proposed: the degree of crowding out, the time horizon considered, direct and indirect crowding out constitute the four main categories. The latter two each have many subcategories. With direct crowding out government economic activity directly enters as an agrument into structural private behavioural relationships. Indirect crowding out refers to crowding out in the reduced form of the model without there being any direct crowding out at the level of the structural private behavioural relationships. A small full employment model is used to analyse the implications of various forms of direct crowding out for the effectiveness of fiscal policy.     

An integration of short run neokeynesian analysis and growth theory

Summary The paper provides a synthesis of short run Neo-Keynesian theory and long run growth models. The general approach is illustrated with the analysis of the short run and long run effect of changes in government spending when government budget deficits and surpluses are bond-financed. Such pure fiscal policy actions are shown to have long run effects on real variables even in a full employment model. The stability properties of the model turn out to depend crucially on the speed of adjustment of inflationary expectations.This paper is based on my Ph.D. DissertationTemporary Equilibrium and Long-Run Equilibrium. The advice and help of James Tobin, Gary Smith and Katsuhito Iwai are gratefully acknowledged. I have also benefitted from discussions with Gregory Chow. The detailed and wide-ranging comments of Dr. Th. C. M. J. van de Klundert and Dr. S. K. Kuipers on earlier drafts of this paper were most valuable, both as regards substance and form.Assistant Professor of Economics and International Affairs, Princeton University.     

Economic,Political, and Institutional Prerequisites for Monetary Union Among the Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council

The paper reviews the arguments for and against monetary union among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council—the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait. Both technical economic arguments and political economy considerations are discussed. I conclude that there is an economic case for GCC monetary union, but that it is not overwhelming. The lack of economic integration among the GCC members is striking. Without anything approaching the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons among the six GCC member countries, the case for monetary union is mainly based on the small size of all GCC members other than Saudi Arabia, and their high degree of openness. Indeed, even without the creation of a monetary union, there could be significant advantages to all GCC members, from both an economic and a security perspective, from greater economic integration, through the creation of a true common market for goods, services, capital and labour, and from deeper political integration. The political arguments against monetary union at this juncture appear overwhelming, however. The absence of effective supranational political institutions encompassing the six GCC members means that there could be no effective political accountability of the GCC central bank. The surrender of political sovereignty inherent in joining a monetary union would therefore not be perceived as legitimate by an increasingly politically sophisticated citizenry. I believe that monetary union among the GCC members will occur only as part of a broad and broadly based movement towards far-reaching political integration. And there is little evidence of that as yet.