Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters' Demand for Redistribution Policy

This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters' demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation of union wage–setting implies lower unemployment and taxes because a fiscal externality is internalised. Under some conditions about the composition of the population, the political–economic equilibrium can further be improved upon by cooperation between the government and the central union. This seems to have happened in the Netherlands where the unions and the government agreed to cut taxes and restrain wages, which has led to the 'Dutch Miracle'.     

Using templates and linguistic patterns to define process performance indicators

Process performance management (PPM) aims at measuring, monitoring and analysing the performance of business processes (BPs), in order to check the achievement of strategic and operational goals and to support decision-making for their optimisation. PPM is based on process performance indicators (PPIs), so having an appropriate definition of them is crucial. One of the main problems of PPIs definition is to express them in an unambiguous, complete, understandable, traceable and verifiable manner. In practice, PPIs are defined informally – usually in ad hoc, natural language, with its well-known problems – or they are defined from an implementation perspective, hardly understandable to non-technical people. In order to solve this problem, in this article we propose a novel approach to improve the definition of PPIs using templates and linguistic patterns. This approach promotes reuse, reduces both ambiguities and missing information, is understandable to all stakeholders and maintains traceability with the process model. Furthermore, it enables the automated processing of PPI definitions by its straightforward translation into the PPINOT metamodel, allowing the gathering of the required information for their computation as well as the analysis of the relationships between them and with BP elements.     

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*

Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.     

Discounting long run average growth in stochastic dynamic programs

Summary. Finding solutions to the Bellman equation often relies on restrictive boundedness assumptions. In this paper we develop a method of proof that allows to dispense with the assumption that returns are bounded from above. In applications our assumptions only imply that long run average (expected) growth is sufficiently discounted, in sharp contrast with classical assumptions either absolutely bounding growth or bounding each period (instead of long run) maximum (instead of average) growth. We discuss our work in relation to the literature and provide several examples. Received: July 26, 2000; revised version: July 10, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am specially grateful to Cuong Le Van and to anonymous referee for detecting an error in a previous version of this paper and for suggestions that sensibly improved the paper. Comments and suggestions are also acknowledged to Michele Boldrin, Raouf Boucekkine, Fabrice Collard, Tim Kehoe, Omar Licandro, and Luis Puch. I am also indebted to participants to the III Summer School on Economic Theory held at the Universidade de Vigo, the Macroeconomics Workshop at the Universitat Autò}noma de Barcelona, and the Econometrics Seminar at Tilburg University. Financial support from the Belgian government, under project PAI P4/01, at the IRES-UCL, from a European Marie Curie fellowship, Grant HPMF-CT-1999-00410, at the CEPREMAP, and from IVIE and Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, under project BEC2001-0535, at the Universidad de Alicante, is gratefully acknowledged.     

A learning methodology using Matlab/Simulink for undergraduate electrical engineering courses attending to learner satisfaction outcomes

Learner-centred approaches follow the prevailing tendency in modern University reforms which are primarily concerned about “how people learn”. The methodologies can be learner-centred in the sense of placing the student as the main actor of the teaching–learning process by increasing his interactivity and participation, but also considering what is relevant for the student by measuring the learner satisfaction. In order to promote both aspects, this paper proposes a synchronous software-based active methodology that makes use of the simulations to show a virtual scenario to the students and challenge them to predict and discuss the evolution of the scenario. The proposed methodology improves the visual interface, promotes discussion both among students and with the teacher in a brainstorming stage and shows real-world examples. This software-based methodology has been implemented into an Electric Machinery course at the University of Seville (Spain), and the evaluation has been carried out considering both the affective and cognitive domains. Principal components analysis proves to be useful to highlight the dimensions with a higher influence on learner satisfaction and the affective and cognitive results confirm the successful implementation of the proposal.     

Politicians’ motivation,political culture,and electoral competition

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. JEL Code D72 · D78     

Exploring The Gender Effect On Europeans’ Retirement Savings

This paper investigates whether European women have the same probability of saving for retirement as European men and if driving factors for this saving behavior differ by gender. The evidence is based on a sample of 6,036 individuals from eight European countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The results show that European women are less likely to save for retirement than men, although the determinants of this decision are similar for both genders. Moreover, the results suggest that country-level institutional factors play a more important role on the individual's retirement attitudes than gender differences.     

Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany

We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker's altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker's laziness depending on his altruism. Using questionnaire data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people's career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.     

Socially Useless Jobs

Recent research suggests that many workers in modern economies think that their job is socially useless, i.e., that it makes no or a negative contribution to society. However, the evidence so far is mainly anecdotal. We use a representative dataset comprising 100,000 workers from forty‐seven countries at four points in time. We find that approximately 8 percent of workers perceive their job as socially useless, while another 17 percent are doubtful about the usefulness of their job. There are sizeable differences among countries, sectors, occupations, and age groups, but no trend over time. A vast majority of workers cares about holding a socially useful job and we find that they suffer when they consider their job useless. We also explore possible causes of socially useless jobs, including bad management, strict job protection legislation, harmful economic activities, labor hoarding, and division of labor.