Efficiency Gains in Unsuccessful Management Buyouts

This article uses a sample of 120 unsuccessful management buyouts (MBOs) to test whether operational improvements following successful MBOs are a result of organizational changes or private information. The findings are consistent with the organizational changes hypothesis. Firms with an unsuccessful MBO had no increase in operating performance following the buyout attempt. In addition, the cumulative abnormal stock return from before the attempted buyout until two years after the attempt is insignificantly different from 0 percent. I also find that management turnover following an unsuccessful MBO is significantly higher than normal.     

Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.     

How Does Credit Supply Expansion Affect the Real Economy? The Productive Capacity and Household Demand Channels

Credit supply expansion can affect an economy by increasing productive capacity or by boosting household demand. In this study, we develop a test to determine if the household demand channel is present, and we implement the test using both a natural experiment in the United States in the 1980s and an international panel of 56 countries over the last several decades. Consistent with the importance of the household demand channel, we find that credit supply expansion boosts nontradable sector employment and the price of nontradable goods, with limited effects on tradable sector employment. Such credit expansions amplify the business cycle and lead to more severe recessions.     

Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems.     

The Structure and Incentive Effects of Corporate Tax Liabilities

This paper describes situations in which tax liabilities assume the form of a negative position in a call option. This structure motivates an examination of the investment decisions of taxed corporations in the presence of risk. It is shown that the structure of the tax liability creates an incentive to underinvest in more risky projects and an incentive for conglomerate merger. These effects are then evaluated in the presence of conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders, and under alternative assumptions about the tax code, and about the timing of investment and financing decisions.     

What Forty Years Should Teach

Reviews in The Economis Journal reveal the unwillingness of economists hostile to the market to acknowledge the failure of collectivist policies. Professor Schwartz here replies to Keith Middlemas.     

Does the Cost Paradox Preclude Technological Progress under Imperfect Competition?

We consider a two‐stage model of R&D/Cournot competition with isoelastic demand satisfying the cost paradox (i.e., that equilibrium profits increase with unit cost). The R&D process has a binary structure, with spillover effects. We provide a negative answer to the question in the title: Under noncooperative R&D, firms will conduct R&D for a broad parameter range, despite the presence of the cost paradox, as a result of being caught in a prisoner's dilemma. A second‐best social planner is shown to have a higher propensity for R&D than the noncooperative scenario. However, if firms engaged in any of the known R&D cooperation scenarios, the answer to the question in the title would become affirmative. It follows that R&D cooperation leads to lower producer and consumer surpluses. This constitutes a major departure from the conclusions of the standard R&D model. Therefore, R&D cooperation in such environments should not receive favorable antitrust treatment.     

Foreign Currency Exposure of Multinational Firms: Accounting Measures and Market Valuation*

Abstract. The accounting method in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 8 for restatement of a foreign operation's financial statements denominated in a foreign currency into the parent's currency equivalents for inclusion in the parent company's financial statements was severely criticized by market participants and managers. Its replacement, SFAS No. 52, represented an attempt to improve on the methods of SFAS No. 8. This study examines two questions: did SFAS No. 8 produce relevant information for valuing US multinational firms, and are the results reported under SFAS No. 52 more valuation relevant than those reported under SFAS No. 8? Valuation relevance is studied because the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has stated that relevance is an important criterion for choosing among alternative accounting methods. Considered collectively, the results suggest that the rules in SFAS No. 8 produced a poor accounting measure for valuing US multinational firms, and that the introduction of SFAS No. 52 has resulted in a significant improvement in the valuation relevance of the accounting numbers associated with the restatement of a foreign operation's financial statements. However, this improvement applies only to the subset of firms that designated a foreign currency as their functional currency (i.e., switched to the current-rate method) and not to firms that designated the dollar as their functional currency (i.e., as if they still reported under SFAS No. 8).