Revisiting EMU's Stability Pact: A Pragmatic Way Forward

The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Some countriesare meeting major problems in sticking to the rules. Proposalsto reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. The allegedweaknesses of the Pact tend to reflect trade-offs typical ofsupra-national arrangements. This aspect has to be factoredin when considering reforms of the current fiscal rules: thereis no miracle solution. EMU without rules would be an interestingexperiment, but a risky policy option. Given the existing degreeof political integration in EMU, internal adjustment ratherthan attempting to redesign the rules from scratch appears amore suitable way forward. Redefining the medium-term budgetarytarget, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscalbias in good times, moving towards non-partisan applicationof the rules, and improving transparency in the data can achieveboth stronger discipline and higher flexibility.     

Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

This paper reviews recent research on central bank independence (CBI). After we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness, research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed. Finally, the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI are discussed. We conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust.     

The quantity approach to financial integration: The Feldstein-Horioka criterion revisited

This paper applies the Feldstein-Horioka criterion, that is, the role of savings-investment correlations, to assess the degree of financial integration in the European Community. We establish a link between the Feldstein-Horioka criterion and three other criteria for financial integration: the covered, uncovered, and real interest parity condition. Subsequently, we evaluate the Feldstein-Horioka criterion for financial integration on the basis of its underlying assumptions. The paper performs both cross-section and time-series analyses of savings-investment correlations. The time-series analysis relies on the concept of cointegration. Our major finding is that the Feldstein-Horioka criterion—contrary to what is usually found in world financial markets—is able to explain an increasing degree of financial integration in the European Community.Symbols S gross national savings - I gross domestic investment - C total private and government final consumption expenditure - M import of goods and services - X export of goods and services - Y gross domestic product - CA current account of the balance of payments - GNP gross national product - NCT net current transfers from the rest of the world - NFI net factor income from the rest of the world - FCF gross fixed capital formation - ST increase in stocks - S_p gross national savings by the private sector - S_g gross national savings by the public sector - I_p gross domestic investment by the private sector - I_g gross domestic investment by the government sector - corrected for a nonzero value of the statistical discrepancy     

Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve Interventions

This paper reports on the results of an empirical investigation into the objectives of daily foreign exchange market intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the U.S. dollar-Deutsche Mark market. Tobit analysis is implemented to estimate the intervention reaction functions consistently. It is found that an increase in the conditional variance in daily exchange rate returns derived from a GARCH model estimated in the paper, led the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve to increase the volume of intervention, both in case of dollar-sales and purchases on account of their leaning against the wind policy.We are grateful to the Deutsche Bundesbank, Hauptabteilung Ausland for kindly providing, on a confidential base, the daily data on the official interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, the latter only to the extent that they affected the net foreign position of the Bundesbank. Also, we want to thank Theo Nijman and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Opinions and errors are our own responsibility.     

How can the Stability and Growth Pact be improved to achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility?

Conclusion  While we are sceptical of re-opening the debate on the SGP,²⁶ we think that its functioning can nonetheless be improved. Our main proposals concern redefining the medium-term budgetary targets, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan application of the rules and improving transparency in the data. This set of ideas allows the achievement of both stronger discipline and higher flexibility and can be implemented without requiring any major revision of the existing rules. These proposals do not provide a recipe for tackling the problems encountered by countries still in transition towards lower deficits in the event of a cyclical slump. Nevertheless, if implemented, they would limit the type of behaviour which is largely responsible for the current fiscal tensions. He is also a member of the Panel of Experts of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament for which this article was written as a Briefing Paper (November 2002).     

Efficiency of capital taxation in an open economy: tax competition versus tax exportation

Tax competition and tax exportation have contrary implications for the efficiency of capital taxation. We provide a simple condition for the dominance of either force, which depends on the mobility of foreign investment. We use this condition to evaluate the relative importance of both forces in the US and in the EU. This paper has benefitted substantially from the comments of the editor, Jay Wilson, and three anonymous referees.     

The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness

This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independencein a monetary policy game with a conservative central bankerIt tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independenceand conservativeness by four economic and political determinants,both theoretically and empirically There appears to be a tradeoff between central bank independence and conservativeness.Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness andindependence with the actual degree of independence, we wantto identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for 12 memberstates of the European Union.