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We provide an interpretation of the productivity dynamics in the manufacturing sector based on the idea of the thick market externality à la Diamond. An econometric model has been estimated which allows to disentangle the long run effects of these trading externalities from those of internal economies of scale and of aggregate industry-level economies. The results obtained—based on a cointegrated system of non-linear-error-correction equations—confirm the hypothesis that the trading externality matters. Moreover, our findings point out that the emphasis generally posited both on internal and external economies of scale is not justified. 相似文献
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Anderlini Luca; Felli Leonardo; Postlewaite Andrew 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2007,23(3):662-684
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies inwhich the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contractingparties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies inthe contract they draw up. Ex post, the court observes whetheran unforeseen contingency occurred and decides whether to voidor uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court,the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex post. There aretwo effects of a court that voids contracts. The parties' incentivesto undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, andthe parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingenciesthat the ex ante contract cannot account for. In this context,we fully characterize the optimal decision rule for the court.The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the trade-offbetween the need for incentives and the gains from insurancethat voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents. 相似文献
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Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, it might not be possible to prevent collusion and renegotiation in equilibrium. Indeed, if collusion is observable but not verifiable, then the organization's optimal incentive scheme will always be renegotiated. If, instead, collusion is not observable to the principal, both collusion and renegotiation will occur in equilibrium with positive probability. The occurrence of collusion and renegotiation should therefore not be taken as evidence of the inefficiency of an organization. 相似文献
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