Interorganisational project dynamics: A longitudinal study of perceptual distance and client-contractor collaborative relationships

Despite the importance of good collaborative relationships in interorganisational projects, clients and contractors often develop adversarial relationships due to perceptual distance about key project issues. In this case study research, we investigated how perceptual distance emerges and changes over time, and how the collaborative relationship between client and contractor develops alongside these dynamics. In this exploration, we built upon agency theory and stewardship theory as complementary perspectives for understanding client-contractor collaborative relationships. We gathered quantitative and qualitative data in two projects, conducting three assessments in about one year. We found that perceptual distance increased and decreased over time, and that a reduction was typically associated with the collaborative relationship being characterized by stewardship rather than agency. These findings suggest that a regular assessment and evaluation of partners’ perceptions of critical project issues is warranted to timely detect and counteract perceptual distance. Moreover, partners would best adopt a stewardship orientation to reduce perceptual distance, although this may take considerable effort given the distributive nature of many pre-project negotiations.     

Larger,counter-intuitive and lasting – The PSM role in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic,exploring opportunities for theoretical and actionable advances

PSM has played an important role in the initial mitigation of risks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. We explore the nature and scope of this role and develop a roadmap for PSM contributions towards greater supply chain resilience. We find that the role of PSM is (1) multidimensional; responding to supply risks but also to demand and logistics risks, (2) counter to game theory; collaboration increased instead of decrease, (3) multi-stage; beyond the initial response the hardest change efforts are still ahead. The pandemic is accelerating the journey towards future-proof PSM but not necessarily revolutionizing the future of PSM.     

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.     

Multinationals and Training: Some Evidence from Irish Manufacturing Industries

This paper sets out to analyse the effect of plant and sectoral level characteristics on the provision of training to employees using plant level data for Irish manufacturing. There is no clear evidence that foreign owned plants are more likely to provide training. By contrast, we find that they spend less than domestic plants on training, ceteris paribus. There is also no evidence that plants that receive training grants are more likely to provide training. This may be likely to reflect the targeting of training grants on plants that are otherwise unlikely to provide much training. We do, however, find that training activity in the sector, either by other foreign or domestic plants, has a positive effect on plant level training activity, at least for domestic owned plants.     

On Assisting Domestic Industries under Bertrand Competition

In a homogeneous‐good duopoly game with a home and a foreign firm, which compete on prices, it has been shown that the optimal way to assist the domestic industry is by a production subsidy. The argument here is that the subsidy is used to keep potential competitive pressure on the foreign firm. This paper analyzes under which conditions this threat of entry of a subsidized home firm is credible. It is shown that in markets where the firms move before the government, a subsidy is not credible and dominated by a tariff in terms of welfare.     

Accounting for control and trust building in interfirm transactional relationships

This paper theorises the accounting-control-trust nexus in interfirm transactional relationships. In the context of such relationships, accounting has predominantly been conceptualised as a control technology. However, in our paper we analyse stable and durable relationships as being the results of interaction between control and trust building. Such an analysis calls for an additional conceptualisation of accounting as a trust building technology. Furthermore, we explain the interaction between accounting for control and accounting for trust building in the context of a process of embedded agency.     

METROPOLITAN HOUSE PRICES IN SOUTH AFRICA: DO THEY CONVERGE?

The question this paper investigates is whether or not different metropolitan areas each constitute a separate housing market or whether or not there is a single South African housing market. Theory on the Law of One Price suggests that if products or geographic areas belong in the same market, their absolute prices must converge, so that their relative prices are stationary. By using cross-sectional time series data of five metropolitan areas, the paper tests for the Law of One Price by applying the Im, Pesaran and Shin panel unit root test. The paper finds strong evidence of convergence in large middle-segment house prices and weaker support for convergence in medium middle-segment house prices. In addition, the paper finds no evidence for convergence in small middle-segment house prices. This suggests the existence of a national market for large and possibly middle-segment houses in metropolitan areas, but separate metropolitan markets for small middle-segment houses. In addition, the paper estimates the speed of convergence and finds that large middle-segment house prices converge within two to seven quarters, while the speed of convergence for medium middle-segment house prices in three of the five areas is five to eight quarters.     

Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

Risk Sharing in a World with Processing Costs: Trading versus Banking

We analyze the bank versus exchange problem in a Diamond Dybvig (1983) economy with exogenous transaction processing costs. We find that processing costs in the market enables the bank to overcome the side trade threat ( Jacklin (1987) ) and offer some desirable liquidity insurance. Moreover, in the bank equilibrium processing costs are proportional to consumption, while in the market economy early and late consumers incur equal costs. These two effects explain that for a given level of aggregate processing costs, the bank economy is superior. On the other hand, the number of transactions in the bank economy is larger. It is for this reason that if processing costs are proportional to transaction value, and independent of the mechanism used, the exchange economy is superior.