Heterogeneous effects of nontariff measures on cross-border investments: Bilateral firm-level analysis

We analyze the heterogeneous effects of technical regulations and safety standards embodied in nontariff measures on foreign direct investment using global firm-level panel data of bilateral cross-border ownership relationships over the period 2008–2018. We develop a novel measure of time-varying bilateral ad valorem equivalents of sectoral nontariff measures, which reveals that technical barriers to trade (TBTs) played a much greater role as a trade-inhibiting factor in comparison with import tariffs and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures over the period 1996–2018. Estimations using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood framework reveal the importance of nontariff measures as a driver of foreign direct investment.     

Determinants of specific trade concerns raised on technical barriers to trade EU versus non-EU

This contribution evaluates determining factors of Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) raised on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) notifications over the period 1995–2011. While multilateral and international agreements bind countries concerning the imposition of tariffs on imports, TBTs have been used as trade policy instruments, which conceal the true motivations of governments. The main legitimate reasons behind the imposition of TBTs are to increase environmental qualities and human health, or to improve market efficiencies. However, in addition to these reasons, governments are also in pursuit of protecting their domestic industries. In fact, this contribution analyses how trade protectionist motives and legitimate public policy objectives induce these specific trade measures. Various effective factors of TBT STC notifications are considered in the econometric analysis using fixed effect Poisson estimation as the main technique, and Poisson GMM as robustness specification. Separate estimations on the European Union block in this study points at the determining factors of TBTs harmonized by heterogeneous member states. Results suggest that bilateral trade and tariffs are one of the forces of TBT STC notifications, acknowledging the protectionist behaviour of authorities. Moreover, countries with high quality of humans’ health-related environmental issues, and low environmental vitalities, are more likely to impose new TBTs. Overall, this study confirms the complex nature of TBT STCs affected by economic, technological, institutional, and health and environmental issues.     

Do changes in the fundamentals have symmetric or asymmetric effects on house prices? Evidence from 52 states of the United States of America

Time-series studies that have tried to establish the long-run relationship between house prices and economic fundamentals have been criticized due to low power of their cointegration tests. On the other hand, those who have used panel data and panel tests to increase the power have found mixed results. Both groups have assumed that changes in the fundamentals have symmetric effects on house prices. In this article, we use nonlinear ARDL approach to cointegration and error-correction modelling and quarterly data from each of the states in the US to show that changes in the fundamentals have asymmetric effects on house prices, in the short run as well as in the long run. Cointegration between house prices and fundamentals is established in 30 states and in District of Columbia.     

Trade policy and global value chains: tariffs versus non-tariff measures

Review of World Economics - Globalisation is increasingly characterised by intertwined geographical and local production processes through global value chains (GVCs). In the presence of GVCs,...     

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: assessment of the humanitarian,economic, and financial impact in the short and medium term

What are the economic effects of the Ukraine war for Ukraine, Russia, and the rest of Europe? In this study, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) sheds light on the immediate consequences on the one hand, but also on the medium-term structural changes caused by the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a humanitarian crisis. Pre-war, almost 19 m people lived in those regions that are currently directly affected. Refugee inflows to the rest of Europe are likely to be at least three times greater than in 2015/2016. As Black Sea ports come under Russian assault, Ukraine has lost its ability to sell more than half of its exports, primarily agricultural commodities and metals. Western financial support will become ever more important as the war continues. Turning to Russia, sanctions will have a very serious impact on that country’s economy and financial sector. Despite being partly hamstrung by the fact that a large proportion of Russian reserve assets are frozen in the EU and G7, the central bank managed to stabilise financial markets by a combination of confidence-building and hard-steering measures: capital controls, FX controls, regulatory easing for financial institutions, and a doubling of the key policy rate. The medium-term and long-term outlook is negative. As a result of the war and the sanctions, the rest of Europe faces a surge in already high inflation; this will weigh on real incomes and will depress economic growth. Many European countries rely heavily on Russia for oil and gas imports: import shares are over 75% in Czechia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria with respect to natural gas; Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland with respect to oil and petroleum; and Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Lithuania, Greece, and Bulgaria with respect to solid fuels. Aside from energy, the fallout via trade for the rest of Europe is likely to be small. Non-energy trade and investment links between Russia and many European countries have declined in importance since 2013. There are four main areas of structural change and lasting impact for the EU (and Europe more broadly) as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. First, the EU will get more serious about defence. Second, the green transition will gather pace. Third, broader Eurasian economic integration will be unwound. And fourth, the EU accession prospects for countries in Southeast Europe could (and should) improve.