Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

Access Pricing,Quality Degradation,and Foreclosure in the Internet

Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The optimal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict between international and domestic regulation policy.     

On optimal control of income generating activities, and the value of flexible production design

The paper provides a closed form solution for the value of a firm which costlessly can change its mode of operation between two activities. The technology is such that production is zero from the inactive production line. In addition we assume that the production potential on any production line is idle when not operated, else the production follows a geometric Brownian motion. Although this framework is rather general, it is motivated by the problem to produce a natural resource located in two separate wells/ores, using a single (flexible) production unit. For what seems to be reasonable parameter values, the flexible unit is seen to achieve a surprisingly large value relative to the value achievable by a comprehensive unit, producing both alternatives simultaneously. In addition it is interesting to note that switching might occur even if the active production line gives the highest immediate income.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

Learning competitive market balance

Summary We exhibit a quite natural, adaptive process generated by price-taking, noncooperative firms, supplying the same market. Under rather mild conditions, that process, being driven by marginal profits, converges to a market clearing, Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Namely, it suffices for convergence that cost functions be strictly convex and that the law of demand holds. Randomness in revenues and costs is accommodated.Support from Ruhrgas is gratefully acknowledged.     

Monetary incentives and environmental concern. Effects of a differentiated garbage fee

Market-based instruments, i.e., economic incentives and disincentives, are gaining popularity in environmental policy. However, research on the effectiveness of economic incentives for regulating environmentally relevant consumer behaviour demonstrates convincingly that the implementation of this instrument is based on inadequate assumptions concerning the motivation guiding consumer behaviour. In this paper it is argued that stronger focus should be placed on studying how the regulation instrument influences the perception of the environmentally relevant activity that it was meant to regulate. The attitudes of Danish citizens towards differentiated garbage fees (implying a relatively small economic incentive) and the impact of its implementation on the attitude towards recycling are analysed. The attitude towards differentiated garbage fees is primarily determined by the perceived equity of differentiated garbage fees and its perceived effectiveness with regard to combating waste problems. The most important determinant of the attitudes towards recycling activities is the expected environmental and public benefits. However, empirical support is found for the hypothesis that the use of monetary incentives at the consumer level may re-frame the recycling issue into the sphere where private cost-benefit calculations apply. The negative effects of this re-framing can more than outweigh the positive impact of the monetary incentive on attitudes and behaviour.

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Zusammenfassung Monetäre Anreize und Umweltbewutsein. Die Wirkung differenzierter Müllgebühren. Marktkonforme Instrumente wie ökonomische Anreize oder Strafen werden in der Umweltpolitik immer populärer. Allerdings zeigen Forschungsergebnisse über die Wirksamkeit ökonomischer Anreize für die Regulierung umweltrelevanten Konsumentenverhaltens, da\ die Anwendung dieses Instrumentes auf unzweckmä\igen Annahmen über die Motivation beruht, die dem Verbraucherverhalten zugrunde liegt. In diesem Beitrag wird gefordert, da\ die Frage stärker in den Mittelpunkt gerückt werden mu\, wie das Regulierungsintrument die Wahrnehmung des umweltrelevanten Verhaltens beeinflu\t, das reguliert werden soll. Eine empirische Studie untersucht die Einstellungen dänischer Bürger gegenüber differenzierten Abfallgebühren (die einen relativ kleinen ökonomischen Anreiz bieten) und die Wirkung dieser Ma\nahme auf die Einstellung gegenüber der Wiederverwertung. Die Einstellung zu differenzierten Müllgebühren wird in erster Linie durch ihre wahrgenommene Gerechtigkeit bestimmt und durch ihre wahrgenommene Wirksamkeit gegenüber den Müllproblemen. Die wichtigsten Determinanten der Einstellung gegenüber der Müllwiederverwertung sind ihre erwarteten allgemeinen Umweltvorteile. Allerdings sprechen die Daten für die Hypothese, da\ monetäre Anreize das Thema der Müllwiederverwertung auf Verbraucherebene auf das Niveau privater Nutzen-Kosten-Kalkulationen herunterdrücken. Die negativen Effekte dieser Verschiebung könnten die positiven Wirkungen monetärer Anreize auf Einstellung und Verhalten sogar überkompensieren.

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The research reported in this paper was sponsored by grants from the Danish Environmental Protection Agency and the Danish Social Science Research Council.     

Corporate smart phones: professionals' conscious engagement in escalating work connectivity

This article explores how the adoption of company sponsored smart phones inflicts upon the lives of professionals. Drawing upon qualitative interviews at a law firm in Brazil, the experiences of new smart phone users are reported upon in detail. Increased accessibility, accuracy and speed in exchanges gave the users a sense of autonomy and flexibility. However, the technology also helped to intensify the organisation's hold on employees outside of regular working hours, reaching into new settings, time slots and social contexts. Employees expressed concerns regarding demands from superiors that negatively affected their private spheres, yet many of them paradoxically requested more efficient smart phone connectivity. The article focuses on the justifications, the different narrative strategies, employed by professionals for their conscious engagement in escalating work connectivity. It is suggested that these justifications display users' attempt to ‘dis‐identify’ with the role and practice they perform.     

Will FinTech make regional banks superfluous for small firm finance? Observations from soft information-based lending in Germany

Regional banks have a competitive advantage in that short distances to clients enable the use of soft information for superior lending decisions. If the ambition of FinTech start-ups to create superior screening and monitoring technologies materialises, this advantage would be diminished and regional banks would become superfluous for small firm finance. To explore this claim, the paper in hand analyses qualitative empirical data about the lending processes and rating system use of regional German savings banks. In essence, the results from participant observation and interviews clarify the importance of “real” soft information for critical lending decisions. The context specificity and limited verifiability of “real” soft information hamper it from being hardened through the use of rating systems and other bank-ICT. Though FinTech's scoring technologies may overcome the first limitation, it appears likely that in the course of scoring development “real” soft information will be systematically crowded out due to the manipulation problem. The paper expects improved access to finance for SMEs if FinTech solutions overcome both limitations of “real” soft information use, or if peer-to-peer lending and regional banks coexist. Deteriorated access to finance is expected if FinTech companies displace the relationship banking of regional banks due to enhanced competition, without preserving the advantages of “real” soft information with superior screening and monitoring technologies. The paper concludes with recommendations on how to prevent deteriorated access to finance for small firms by promoting fair competition and FinTech innovations.