普胸手术围术期发生心律失常的危险因素分析及护理

文章对437例普胸手术病例行回顾性分析,探讨了普胸手术围术期发生心律失常的危险因素。结果显示,高龄患者(≥60岁)、术后剧烈疼痛未按时止痛者、围术期低氧血症者更易并发心律失常(P<0.5)。由此得出,高龄、疼痛、低氧血症是普胸手术围术期发生心律失常的重要危险因素。     

重渡沟"景区公司+农户"的旅游产业组织模式研究

重渡沟"景区公司 农户"模式是一种基于农村社区的旅游产业组织方式,其本质就是互补品生产企业在不涉及产权的情况下,在经营层面上实现的一体化,是旅游目的地内部具有地方政府背景和主导地位的景区开发管理公司为实现地方旅游业持续发展而作出的必然选择。公司对农家旅馆的低价格定价、质量管理以及对农家旅馆市场的垄断都是对产权缺失的一种弥补。"景区公司 农户"模式有效地约束了机会主义行为的发生,保证了旅游目的地的健康、持续发展。     

中国经济之强劲增长：对东亚的寓意

中国的崛起对东亚经济产生了深刻影响。不仅中国在东北亚的近邻通过贸易和投资从中国的开放政策中获益，而且那些曾经与中国争夺国外直接投资（FDI）和出口市场的东盟国家也开始从中国的经济增长中得到好处。中国作为世界经济增长的发动机之一已经对其东亚邻国产生了积极影响。通过“东盟＋3”方案，特别是始于2002年的“中国-东盟”自由贸易协定，中国为东亚地区经济一体化提供了新的动力，从而为东亚经济增长发挥着日益重要的地缘政治和地缘经济作用。     

Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia

In emerging markets, the agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. We examine whether external independent auditors are employed as monitors or as bonding mechanisms, or both, to alleviate the agency problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structures are more likely to employ Big 5 auditors. This relation is evident among firms that raise equity capital frequently. Consistently, firms hiring Big 5 auditors receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency conflicts. Also, we find that Big 5 auditors take into consideration their clients' agency problems when making audit fee and audit report decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

An extended multinomial-Dirichlet model for error bounds for dollar-unit sampling*

Abstract. This paper describes an extension of the Tsui, Matsumura, and Tsui (1985) procedure, which is based on a multinomial distribution model within the dollar-unit sampling framework, with a Dirichlet prior distribution. The extended model and a different Dirichlet prior are used in this study to generate upper and lower bounds and two-sided confidence intervals for situations in which both understatement and overstatement errors are possible. The reported simulation study indicates that the achieved confidence levels of the proposed estimates are usually close to or greater than the nominal levels in repeated sampling for the populations studied. Résumé. Les auteurs décrivent une extension du procédé de Tsui, Matsumura et Tsui (1985) basée sur un modèle de distribution multinômiale dans le contexte de l'échantillonnage en unités monétaires, avec une distribution a priori de Dirichlet. Les auteurs utilisent l'extension du modèle et une distribution a priori de Dirichlet différente pour obtenir des limites supérieures et inférieures, et des intervalles de confiance bilatéraux pour les cas où des erreurs de sous-évaluation aussi bien que de surévaluation sont envisageables. L'étude de simulation qui fait l'objet du compte rendu montre que les niveaux de confiance obtenus relativement aux estimations proposées se rapprochent habituellement des valeurs nominales où les excèdent lorsqu'on procède à des échantillonnages répétés des populations à l'étude.     

Does the More Risk‐Averse Investor hold a Less Risky Portfolio?*

We study the suitability of using absolute risk aversion as a measure of willingness to take risk in the Arrow–Debreu portfolio framework. We define a global measure of risk for the Arrow–Debreu portfolio, which is measured by the sensitivity of an individual's Arrow–Debreu portfolio payoff to the change in the market return. We call this measure ‘conservatism’ and show that the concept of ‘more conservative’ is stronger than that of ‘more risk‐averse.’ A higher absolute risk aversion is only necessary but not sufficient to induce a less risky Arrow–Debreu portfolio. Our results not only challenge the well‐accepted notion that a more risk‐averse investor holds a less risky portfolio, but also suggest a stronger measure – conservatism – for evaluating the riskiness of portfolio.     

CROSS‐HEDGING OF EXCHANGE RATE RISKS: A NOTE*

This note studies the optimal production and hedging decisions of a competitive international firm that exports to two foreign countries. The firm faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Cross‐hedging is plausible in that one of the two foreign countries has a currency forward market. We show that the firm's optimal forward position is an over‐hedge, a full‐hedge or an under‐hedge, depending on whether the two random exchange rates are strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated or negatively correlated, respectively.