Characteristics determining the efficiency of foreign banks in Australia

The factors determining foreign bank efficiency are investigated using a three stage research method. It is found that host market incumbency reduces efficiency of foreign banks in Australia, resulting in over use of inputs. Factors underlying the limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al. [Berger, Allen N., DeYoung, Robert, Genay, Hesna, Udell, Gregory F., 2000. Globalisation of financial institutions: Evidence from cross-border banking performance. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Service 3, 23–120] are identified, in that nationality specific factors represented by dummy variables are not significant once other relevant effects are controlled for. Parent profitability is not found to result in increased host nation efficiency, while parent credit rating effects are mixed. Some evidence is presented that banks from more financially sophisticated nations are more efficient. The implications of these results are explored from the perspectives of bank management and bank regulators.     

Funktionswandel der EZB?

Die Kernaufgabe der Europ?ischen Zentralbank ist es, die Preisstabilit?t zu gew?hrleisten. Die Finanz- und Staatsschuldenkrise hat der EZB die Rolle aufgezwungen, durch Notma?nahmen die Stabilit?t der W?hrungsunion zu sichern. Ihre Unabh?ngigkeit wird zunehmend dadurch gef?hrdet, dass es in diesem Prozess zu einer Verquickung von Fiskal- und Geldpolitik kommt. W ünschenswert w?re eine Rückkehr der EZB zu ihrer alten Rolle und eine Strategie, die für einen Abbau der weltweiten und europ?ischen Ungleichgewichte sorgen k?nnte.     

Tax Ratios in Macroeconomics: Do Taxes Really Matter?

In various empirical studies so-called tax ratios (tax revenues expressed as a ratio of some aggregate tax base) are employed as approximations for tax burdens. The most difficult problem in calculating tax ratios is the way in which personal income tax revenues are attributed to labour and capital. We argue that the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) is seriously flawed in this respect. Using information from national sources, we calculate more accurate tax ratios for eight OECD countries that differ substantially from those of Mendoza et al. (1997). Still, the results of the empirical analysis of Mendoza et al. (1997) do not change significantly if we use our tax ratios instead of those of Mendoza et al.. However, the results change once country specific effects are taken up in the model. Capital taxes are, e.g., shown to reduce economic growth. We find that the results of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) are neither sensitive to the use of the tax ratios nor to the specification of the model: high labour taxes have increased unemployment in Europe.     

Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?

We investigate whether elected members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970–2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional, country and year effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.     

Political and economic determinants of OECD budget deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation

Recent theoretical and empirical research has examined the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect national policy formation, in order to explain cross-country differences in fiscal policies. In this note we investigate cross-country differences in debt accumulation and the level of government spending in the OECD countries over the period 1982–1992. Our findings are negative and suggest a reappraisal of previous research. In particular, neither the growth of government debt nor the level of government spending is related to the corrected Roubini–Sachs power dispersion index.     

Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary Policy

Abstract. Over the last decade, the simple instrument policy rule developed by Taylor has become a popular tool for evaluating the monetary policy of central banks. As an extensive empirical analysis of the European Central Bank's (ECB) past behaviour still seems to be in its infancy, we estimate several instrument policy reaction functions for the ECB to shed some light on actual monetary policy in the euro area under the presidency of Wim Duisenberg and answer questions like whether the ECB has actually followed a stabilizing or a destabilizing rule so far. Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, the evidence presented suggests that the ECB is accommodating changes in inflation and hence follows a destabilizing policy. However, this impression seems to be largely due to the lack of a forward-looking perspective in such specifications. Either assuming rational expectations and using a forward-looking specification, or using expectations as derived from surveys result in Taylor rules that do imply a stabilizing role of the ECB. The use of real-time industrial production data does not seem to play such a significant role as in the case of the United States.     

Does central bank communication really lead to better forecasts of policy decisions? New evidence based on a Taylor rule model for the ECB

Nowadays, it is widely believed that greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which real-time expected inflation and output growth are used. We use five indicators of ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that even though the indicators are sometimes quite different from one another, they add information that helps predict the next policy decision of the ECB. Furthermore, also when the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant.     

Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.