Risk aversion,prudence and temperance: An experiment in gain and loss

We characterize the individual's attitude towards risk, prudence and temperance in the gain and loss domains. We analyze the links between the three features of preferences for a given domain and between domains for each feature of preferences. Consequently, the reflection effect, the mixed risk aversion and the risk apportionment, are key concepts of our study. We also display some determinants for risk aversion, prudence and temperance in each domain. To do this, we conducted a lab experiment with students eliciting risk aversion, prudence and temperance in the two domains, and collected information about each subject's characteristics.     

Understanding the trend to mobile-only internet connections:A decomposition analysis

A growing portion of internet users rely solely on mobile devices such as smartphones for their online access. The percentage of “mobile-only” households increased from 9% in 2011 to 20% in 2015, more than doubling in only four years. As this shift continues, it leads to the question of what factors are driving the rise in mobile-only adoption. Using nationally representative data, this study uses logistic regressions and a decomposition technique to understand the trend. The decomposition reveals that a significant portion (65%) of the growth was due to an increase in the download speeds of mobile networks. An increased acceptance of mobile-only access by households aged 55 and older was also partly responsible. Understanding (and developing a response to) the trend towards mobile-only adoption will be important as organizations and governments continue to work to close the digital divide.     

Firm age and performance

Amid increasing interest in firm age and its effects on firm performance, this special issue offers an exhaustive review of the literature and a novel collection of evidence on the effects of firm age on performance, including a special focus of interest on innovation performance, financial performance, exports, survival and growth. This editorial positions the theme in the extant literature, and provides key definitions and challenges ahead in the field of evolutionary economics. It introduces the collection of articles composing the special issue. The papers offer a diversity of country contexts, as well as analytical approaches and methods. They include an exhaustive review of the literature on age and firms’ performance, and present original empirical studies focusing on the effects of age on firms’ economic outcomes on the one hand, and on innovation outcomes on the other hand. While most of the papers use econometric analysis, the level of analysis ranges from firm to individual.     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.     

Pricing of Mutual Fund Services in Retirement Plans: Evidence from Open-End Equity Funds

Management fees of mutual funds are more costly to investors than is often realized. Moreover, research indicates that in many cases, the fees are not related to performance, contrary to what might be expected from an efficient market. This study uses sample data to illustrate the consequences of inefficiency to an individual investor. It then turns to an empirical examination of the determinants of the ratio of management fees to total assets (MER), investigating market concentration, fund performance, and non-performance characteristics as explanatory variables. All of these classes of variables contributed to the variation of MERs . JEL Classification G23     

How Leviathan Taxes

The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights.