From theory into practice? Restructuring and dynamism in transition economies

This paper draws on microeconomic, industry-level, and macroeconomicevidence to investigate the mechanisms of enterprise restructuringin transition economies, its outcomes in terms of industry-levelexport performance, and its interaction with macroeconomic policyand constraints. The aim is to throw light on the process bywhich catch-up is taking place in the leading transition economies.We begin at the micro level and find that institutional changeshave produced improvements in performance more or less in linewith theoretical predictions. Variation in the extent of policychanges helps to account for cross-country differences in restructuringbehaviour. In the leading transition countries where growthhas been under way for a number of years, many features of theenterprise sector differentiate it from that of an advancedmarket economy. To measure the extent of catch-up associatedwith the reforms, use is made of detailed information aboutthe quality of goods traded on the EU market. In the final section,the inclusion of macroeconomic constraints allows distinctivetransition paths to catching up in the Visegrad countries tobe identified.     

INCOME DISTRIBUTION,TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

This paper explores the features of a dynamic multisectoral model that focuses on the relationship between income distribution, growth and international specialization. The model is explored both for the steady‐state properties and the transitory dynamics of integrated economies. Income inequality affects the patterns of growth and international specialization as the model uses non‐linear Engel curves and hence different income groups are characterized by different expenditure patterns. At the same time income distribution is also reflected in the relative wage rates of skilled to unskilled workers, i.e. the skill premium, and hence the wage structure affects comparative costs of industries which have different skill intensities. The model is applied to a situation that analyses qualitatively different economic development strategies of catching‐up economies (a ‘Latin American’ scenario and a ‘East Asian’ scenario).     

Industrial Specialization,Catching‐up and Labour Market Dynamics

This paper presents a dynamic model as a heuristic tool to discuss some issues of changing industrial specialization which arise in the context of catching‐up processes of (technologically) less advanced economies and the impact which various scenarios of such catching‐up processes might have on the labour market dynamics both in the advanced and in the catching‐up economies. In analysing the evolution of international specialization, we demonstrate the twin pressures exerted upon the industrial structures of “northern” economies: competition from “type‐A southern” economies, which maintain a comparative competitive strength in labour‐intensive and less skill‐intensive branches, and competition from “type‐B catching‐up” economies, whose catching‐up increasingly focuses upon branches in which the initial productivity gaps and hence the scope for catching‐up are the highest. The contrast between these two catching‐up scenarios allows the explicit analysis of the implications of “comparative advantage switchovers” between northern and southern (type B) economies for labour market dynamics.     

Structural shifts in the manufacturing export performance of oecd economies

This paper identifies structural shifts in manufacturing export performance of the major OECD economies. The particular emphasis of this study is to see whether the longer-run responses of a country's exports to the growth in world demand have undergone trend changes. The econometric work focuses on the time variation in income elasticities from an export demand model over the period 1963–89. It thus covers a period in which there was a substantial slow-down in world economic growth and in which the manufacturing sectors in advanced economies underwent substantial restructuring in the wake of the two oil-price shocks and the competitive challenges of Japan and the NICs. The exercise attempted to evaluate the relative successes and failures of the different OECD economies to maintain or improve their positions in the ‘higher quality’ (income elastic) segments of world trade. Evidence was found for trend improvements in the income elasticity for UK exports from the early 1980s onwards and a trend decline for that of the US over the same period. The effects of non-tariff protection against Japanese exports also showed up in our results and an attempt was made to separately identify its effects.     

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: assessment of the humanitarian,economic, and financial impact in the short and medium term

What are the economic effects of the Ukraine war for Ukraine, Russia, and the rest of Europe? In this study, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) sheds light on the immediate consequences on the one hand, but also on the medium-term structural changes caused by the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a humanitarian crisis. Pre-war, almost 19 m people lived in those regions that are currently directly affected. Refugee inflows to the rest of Europe are likely to be at least three times greater than in 2015/2016. As Black Sea ports come under Russian assault, Ukraine has lost its ability to sell more than half of its exports, primarily agricultural commodities and metals. Western financial support will become ever more important as the war continues. Turning to Russia, sanctions will have a very serious impact on that country’s economy and financial sector. Despite being partly hamstrung by the fact that a large proportion of Russian reserve assets are frozen in the EU and G7, the central bank managed to stabilise financial markets by a combination of confidence-building and hard-steering measures: capital controls, FX controls, regulatory easing for financial institutions, and a doubling of the key policy rate. The medium-term and long-term outlook is negative. As a result of the war and the sanctions, the rest of Europe faces a surge in already high inflation; this will weigh on real incomes and will depress economic growth. Many European countries rely heavily on Russia for oil and gas imports: import shares are over 75% in Czechia, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria with respect to natural gas; Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, and Finland with respect to oil and petroleum; and Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Lithuania, Greece, and Bulgaria with respect to solid fuels. Aside from energy, the fallout via trade for the rest of Europe is likely to be small. Non-energy trade and investment links between Russia and many European countries have declined in importance since 2013. There are four main areas of structural change and lasting impact for the EU (and Europe more broadly) as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. First, the EU will get more serious about defence. Second, the green transition will gather pace. Third, broader Eurasian economic integration will be unwound. And fourth, the EU accession prospects for countries in Southeast Europe could (and should) improve.