Do Patented Innovations Reduce Stock Price Crash Risk?*

Using a large sample of US firms, we document a significantly negative relation between the number of patents (citations) and stock price crash risk. Our findings are consistent with the arguments that patented innovation activities send a high‐quality signal and reduces proprietary information costs, which lowers information asymmetry and enhance disclosure. Further, we find that such impact of patented innovation on stock price crash risk is more pronounced in firms with weak corporate governance and high information opacity. Our findings provide new evidence on the real effects of patented innovation on crash risk in equity market.     

Debt Relief and Credit to the Private Sector in African Countries

Abstract: The purpose of the paper is to empirically investigate the link between debt relief and credit to the private sector in African countries using a panel method over the period 1988–2004. The motivation for investigating the relationship between debt relief and credit to the private sector follows Christensen's (2004) hypothesis that domestic debt has a negative impact on the credit to private sector; therefore debt relief is expected to alleviate domestic debt and thereby create space for domestic credit, which if it is mostly constituted of public sector credit, crowds out credit to the private sector. The main results of the paper are as follows: (1) debt relief has a significant and positive effect on credit to the private sector in the short term; (2) in the long term, debt relief has positive effects on domestic credit to the private sector only when associated with good initial institutional quality.     

Analyst following of privatized firms around the world: The role of institutions and ownership structure

We examine which factors affect the decision of analysts to follow newly privatized firms as well as the factors that determine the extent of that following. Contrary to traditional private firms, privatized firms harbor particular uncertainties related to the government's commitment toward privatization. The first-stage estimation shows that the decision by analysts to initiate coverage of newly privatized firms is positively influenced by lower political risk, better judicial efficiency, better information disclosure, and effective extra-legal institutions in the country. Conditional on the decision to initiate coverage, the second-stage results indicate that the extent of analyst following is more important: (1) when there is control relinquishment by the government, (2) when there is more participation by foreign investors and employees, and (3) for those larger firms in nonstrategic sectors. Finally, analysts' coverage is negatively related to postprivatization ownership concentration and underpricing. This latter result runs counter to the existing evidence on private firms—that is, that underpricing “buys” coverage.