Forecasting the Adoption of GM Oilseed Rape: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment in Germany

This paper explores farmers’ willingness to adopt genetically modified (GM) oilseed rape prior to its commercial release and estimates the ‘demand’ for the new technology. The analysis is based upon choice experiments with 202 German arable farmers. A multinomial probit estimation reveals that GM attributes such as gross margin, expected liability from cross pollination, or flexibility in returning to conventional oilseed rape significantly affect the likelihood of adoption. Neighbouring farmers’ attitudes towards GM cropping and a number of farmer and farm characteristics were also found to be significant determinants of prospective adoption. Demand simulations suggest that adoption rates are very sensitive to the profit difference between GM and non‐GM rape varieties. A monopolistic seed price would substantially reduce demand for the new technology. A monopolistic seed supplier would reap between 45% and 80% of the GM rent, and the deadweight loss of the monopoly would range between 15% and 30% of that rent. The remaining rent for farmers may be too small to outweigh possible producer price discounts resulting from the costs of segregating GM and non‐GM oilseed rape along the supply chain.     

How well do conservation auctions perform in achieving landscape‐level outcomes? A comparison of auction formats and bid selection criteria

This paper studies the performance of auction design features regarding pricing mechanisms and bid selection criteria for securing wildlife zones across different holdings. We compare two pricing mechanisms: a discriminatory‐price auction and a uniform‐price ascending auction, and four bid selection criteria on the basis of: total bid, bid‐per‐value ratio, bid‐per‐area ratio and a mixed criterion where bids are formed on the basis of cost but they are selected based on the bid‐per‐value ratio. We develop a best‐response group‐bidding model for a discriminatory‐price auction where bidders form optimal group bids for individual wildlife zones. In the uniform‐price ascending auction, individual landholders respond to prices, which are successively raised by the auctioneer and whenever all the landholders from a single zone agree to participate (i.e. the first zone is formed), the auction stops. Based on numerical simulations using a bio‐economic model of malleefowl conservation, we observe that the discriminatory‐price auction is more cost‐effective than the uniform‐price ascending auction. However, the budgetary cost‐effectiveness of a discriminatory‐price auction is sensitive to bidder uncertainty about the number of competing bidder groups and the highest cost of establishing a wildlife zone among these groups. In terms of bid selection, the mixed bid selection criterion performs best. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Conceptualizing and operationalizing nodal tourism functions

This paper reviews conceptualizations of nodal functions and presents a methodology for identifying and measuring the tourism functions of specific places with reference to place competitiveness. The methodology, which combines measures of length of stay and purpose of visit, is illustrated by a survey-based comparative analysis of ferry passengers traveling between two tourist nodes in New Zealand: Wellington and Picton. The results show distinctive differences between the two places in terms of their multiple functions expressed as origins, gateways, stopovers and destinations. Opportunities for modifying functions appear to be greatest amongst international travelers.     

Delegation and the Regulation of Risk

Political principals typically use low-cost “fire-alarm” signals transmitted by the media, interest groups, and disaffected constituents to monitor the activities of regulatory agencies. We argue that regulatory decision making is biased and inconsistent if the instruments of political oversight are simple and the information flows to the principal are coarse relative to the complexity of the regulatory environment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D72, L51.     

Institutional checks and balances and the political control of the money supply

The Nordhaus hypothesis about the political business cycle assertsthat elected politicians have incentives to expand the moneysupply prior to elections to stimulate the economy and therebyengineer their re-election. Central bank independence is widelyregarded as an institutional solution to this problem. However,this solution works only if central bankers are not perfectagents of their political principals, perhaps because they areconservative (more inflation-averse). This artide proposes analternative solution: political business cycles may be obstructedby institutional checks and balances. The analysis applies tothe Deutsche Bundesbank and has implications for the institutionalstructure of the future European Central Bank.     

Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers

Self-interested individuals pursue their goals rationally taking into account the constraints imposed by their environment and best-responding to the strategic behavior of other individuals: when applied to collective action, economic theory predicts undersupply.
Meanwhile, the behavior of masses of people is described as excitable, emotional, irrational, suggestible, hypnotic, disorderly, and unpredictable: in practice, it seems, collective action is oversupplied, and erratically so. The contagious and volatile dynamics of collective action appear to defy rationalization.
I conceptualize a social movement as a dynamic informational cascade. Turbulencies emerge endogenously from rational individual behavior. Disorderly mass behavior is a by-product of a powerful decentralized mechanism of information aggregation.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungAus dem Französischen übersetzt von Alexander Gerschenkron, WienAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Alexander Gerschenkron, WienÜbersetzung aus dem Italienischen von Erich Allina, WienAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Erich Allina, Wien