Finite sample multivariate structural change tests with application to energy demand models

This paper considers finite sample motivated structural change tests in the multivariate linear regression model with application to energy demand models, in which case commonly used structural change tests remain asymptotic. As in Dufour and Kiviet [1996. Exact tests for structural change in first-order dynamic models. Journal of Econometrics 70, 39–68], we account for intervening nuisance parameters through a two-stage maximized Monte Carlo test procedure. Our contributions can be classified into five categories: (i) we extend tests for which a finite-sample theory has been supplied for Gaussian distributions to the non-Gaussian context; (ii) we show that Bai et al. [1998. Testing and dating common breaks in multi-variate time series. The Review of Economic Studies 65 (3), 395–432] test severely over-rejects and propose exact variants of this test; (iii) we consider predictive break test approaches which generalize tests in Dufour [1980. Dummy variables and predictive tests for structural change. Economics Letters 6, 241–247] and Dufour and Kiviet [1996. Exact tests for structural change in first-order dynamic models. Journal of Econometrics 70, 39–68]; (iv) we propose exact (non-Bonferonni based) extensions of the multivariate outliers test from Wilks [1963. Multivariate statistical outliers. Sankhya Series A 25, 407–426] to models with covariates; (v) we apply these tests to the energy demand system analyzed by Arsenault et al. [1995. A total energy demand model of Québec: forecasting properties. Energy Economics 17 (2), 163–171]. For two out of the six industrial sectors analyzed over the 1962–2000 period, break and further goodness-of-fit and diagnostic tests allow to identify (and correct) specification problems arising from historical regulatory changes or (possibly random) industry-specific effects. The procedures we propose have potential useful applications in statistics, econometrics and finance (e.g. event studies).     

Pricing-to-market tests in instrumental regressions: Case of the transportation equipment industry

Pricing-to-market (PTM) theory suggests that exporting monopolistic firms adjust their destination-specific mark-ups in the face of exchange rate shocks. A large proportion of the existing evidence for PTM comes from Wald tests applied to OLS- and IV-estimated parameters of single-equation models. Such tests can seriously over-reject in the presence of endogeneity and weak instruments so that some of the available results supporting PTM could be spurious. In this paper we revisit the PTM evidence for Japanese and German exporting firms in the transportation equipment industry. Using the model of Marston (1990), we apply exogeneity and LR-LIML-based tests for which the error probability is controlled irrespective of the quality of the available instruments. Our results show right-hand-side endogeneity in almost all of the examined PTM equations. In addition, we find that statistical decisions often differ depending on whether they are based on the traditional Wald test or on our proposed test.The authors would like to thank Philippe Barla, Jean-Thomas Bernard, Christos Constantatos, Larry Schembri, seminar participants at the Bank of Canada, and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Richard Marston for providing data. Finally, a special thanks to Marjorie Santos for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are our own and should not be attributed to the Bank of Canada.First version received: May 2002/Final version received: December 2002     

Nineteenth Century Urban Market Failure?: Chadwick on Funeral Industry Regulation

This essay analyzes the regulatory theory and policy preceptions of Edwin Chadwick (1800-1890), the premier Benthamite utilitarian reformer. We focus on and analyze Chadwicks economic diagnosis of the London funeral market in the first half of the nineteenth century. In his view, externalities and market failure in both the burial and funeral service markets demanded socialization of property rights and implementation of a franchise bidding scheme. Chadwicks rationales for government intervention, including high taxes and information costs—unique, we believe, for his time—provide the basis for numerous forms of contemporary regulations at all levels in the United States today.     

Personal service companies and the public sector

Off-payroll workers in the UK, including personal service companies (PSCs), engaged by the public sector have been giving ‘assurance’ of their tax position to departments in the sector since 2012. Departments must be satisfied with the assurance. For PSCs this requires awareness of complex tax legislation (IR35), which is aimed at preventing tax avoidance. Costs may be incurred in attaining the necessary knowledge. This may bring into question costs incurred in protecting tax revenue. No similar obligation exists in the private sector.     

Should Cookie Monster adopt a healthy lifestyle or continue to indulge? Insights into brand icons

Developing a brand icon has been a way for marketers to humanize and forge relationships with consumers. Icon development takes time. During this time, marketers have to face how much they stay true and consistent with their icons and how much they allow their icons to adapt to cultural changes in the marketplace. Little is known about how consumers respond to changing icons, and even less is known about whether there may be certain consumer groups that are more or less receptive to such changes. Four experiments and qualitative interviews were undertaken to gain insights into these issues. People who have a low need to belong were most impacted by changes in the icon, with effects most evident among consumers with a fearful attachment style. Feelings of rejection were found to amplify these effects. These findings have implications both for theory and practice.     

Increasing cooperation among plants,symbionts, and farmers is key to past and future progress in agriculture

The collective welfare of crop plants, their microbial symbionts, farmers, and society can be undermined by tragedies of the commons. A crop could increase resource allocation to grain if each plant invested less in sending roots into soil already explored by neighbors and less in stem growth. But evolutionary fitness depends on which plants capture the most soil resources and light (e.g., by growing taller than their neighbors), not just on the efficiency with which those resources are used. As for symbionts, with several strains infecting each plant, only host-imposed sanctions limit the fitness of strains that divert more resources to their own reproduction, at the expense of activities that benefit their host plant. Similarly, individual farmers do not necessarily benefit from pest- and resource-management practices that benefit farmers collectively or society as a whole. Plant breeders have increased crop yields by reversing past selection for individual fitness and they could breed for crops that would favor more-cooperative microbial symbionts. Better aligning interests among farmers and society may be more difficult.     

Regulating,joint bargaining,and the demise of precedent

Recent decades have seen a fundamental shift in the nature of economic regulation in the United States. Unauthorized by congress, and largely unnoted in legal and academic circles, regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission have changed the regulatory process by linking otherwise unrelated regulatory issues. Examples include tying merger approval to firm commitments to engage in conceptually unrelated build‐outs and other projects of political importance. This linking of issues has several effects, the most prominent being (a) tying regulatory issues changes the outcomes obtained, plausibly in predictable ways; (b) tying in some circumstances allows regulators to extend their authority to issues for which they have little or no legal authority; and (c) tied regulatory bargaining fails to produce valid legal precedent for firm decision making. We provide an analysis of these conclusions by examining the increasing use of consent decrees, voluntary merger commitments, and merger conditions by the Federal Communications Commission, referencing our discussion with a simple model of joint bargaining applicable to regulatory practice.     

Going to the movies: cinema development in Singapore

Using readings of Foucault's heterotropia and Friedberg's imaginary mobility, this paper analyses movie-going as leisure practice. In highlighting the paucity of research in this area, the paper argues that such practice should be understood as a symbolic interaction between people's behaviour and the spaces that they occupy. This theorization is applied to Singapore, where per capita movie-going is amongst the highest in the world. The paper illustrates how, in Singapore, the development of cinemas has been used to underpin land use policies associated with the relocation of residential areas and social policies related to the growth in consumerism. While effectively alienating older audiences, the paper argues that the spatial and cultural metonymy of the cinema with other primary consumption sites – the mall and the fast food outlet – offers young people reassurance about the growing centrality of consumerism to contemporary social life in Singapore. We argue that the cinema offers a temporary escape from the regulation of social life – access to ‘deviant’ space. However, this same consumerism that facilitates such access simultaneously denotes conformity with the dominant ideology: acceptance of the heterotropic possibilities – and limitations – of cinema and movie-going as leisure practice.     

Learning to glow

Create a cooperative environment within your organization and you will radiate energy, innovation and success, says Lynda Gratton .     

Entry and product quality under price regulation

Spence (1975, footnote 5, p. 420) has shown that, in equilibrium, a price-regulated monopoly will supply a socially suboptimal level of quality. This tendency to undersupply quality has been used to justify an expansion of regulatory controls to the quality dimension in certain regulated industries (e.g., electricity and telecommunications). In this paper, we examine the effects of entry on equilibrium product quality in an industry which is price-regulated. A generalized conjectural variation model is used which allows both monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. Using this model, we find that regulation generally leads to a socially nonoptimal (either too high or too low) level of quality, where the direction of the resulting departure from optimal quality depends upon the conjectures that firms form. Spence's result is obtained as a special case. We then demonstrate that a policy that encourages (or, at least, does not discourage) entry into the regulated market will cause equilibrium quality to move in a social-welfare-improving direction, regardless of the direction of the original distortion.