Disguised Protectionism, Global Trade Rules and Alien Invasive Species

Current international law strongly favors policies designed to make imports safer (e.g., in terms of invasive species) over policies explicitly designed to discourage imports. We show that this preference may be counterproductive. A externality in trade is incorporated into a political-economy model of policy formation. Nations can address the externality by inspecting cargo and imposing a fine on contaminated imports. We compare the equilibrium when inspection is the only policy option relative to the equilibrium that emerging when nations may also manipulate the tariff. Ruling out the tariff causes socially excessive stringency in general, social welfare losses if domestic supply is highly inelastic, and in some circumstances an increase in the real tariff, measured as the difference between world and domestic prices.     

The Relative Importance of Employer and Employee Effects on Compensation: A Comparison of France and the United States

Using individual data on compensation, matched with establishment and firm data on performance and inputs, we compare the French and American pay systems. The compensation measures are decomposed into components related to measured individual characteristics, establishment–enterprise effects, and a residual. In France, the compensation outcomes are more compressed than in the United States. For France, individual characteristics and establishment effects explain more of the variability in compensation outcomes than in the United States. The observable and unobservable components of compensation are identically correlated in the two countries. The relations among compensation components (individual and establishment) and firm performance outcomes (value-added per worker, sales per worker, and profit per unit of capital) exhibit some important similarities and differences between the countries. Higher paid workers, either because of individual characteristics or establishment effects, are employed in firms that are more productive. Higher pay due to enterprise heterogeneity is associated with higher profitability in France but lower profitability in the United States. J. Japan Int. Econ. December 2001, 15(4), pp. 419–436. Department of Labor Economics, Cornell University, 259 Ives Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853–3901, CREST and NBER; CREST-INSEE, 15, bd Gabriel Péri, 92245 Malakoff Cedex, France, CEPR and IZA; LAMIA-TEAM, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 106–112, bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France, and Crest; and Department of Economics, University of Missouri–Columbia, 118 Professional Bldg., Columbia, Missouri 65211. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J31, D21.     

Should employment authorities worry about mergers and acquisitions?

This paper considers the role of mergers and acquisitions on employment. First, it considers the importance of different aspects of compensation policy and human resource management practices for distinguishing acquired and acquiring firms. Second, it examines which individuals from which firms remain with the newly created entity after the takeover. Using a unique employer–employee linked data set for France, we find that very few observable workforce or compensation characteristics distinguish acquired from acquiring firms ex-ante. Nevertheless, the human resources department seems to be quite active in the post-takeover period, with employees of the acquired firm having a lower probability of continued employment with the new entity in the short term after takeover than those of the acquiring firm and with the differences between the two types of firms disappearing after 3 years. The workers with characteristics that tend to be associated with the fastest subsequent job finding in the displaced worker literature are also those who tend to be overrepresented among the individuals who separate from their employer post-takeover. Finally, as both acquired and acquiring firms differ from firms not involved in takeover activity in a similar manner, employment authorities may be able to anticipate the regions in which takeovers are more likely to occur by looking at the financial accounts of firms with particular characteristics that have local establishments.

Endogenous enclosure in North-South trade

Abstract .  We show that the second-best case against the optimality of free trade remains valid in the face of a well-targeted, but costly, policy response. Trade between a North, where property rights can be enforced at relatively low cost, and an otherwise identical South, yields trade patterns and welfare results nearly identical to those previously shown to arise if North and South differ exogenously in the extent of control over resources. Both nations respond optimally to world prices, and the opening of trade leads to the development of property rights in the South. Nonetheless, for a set of world prices bounded by the South's autarky price, the South is better off under autarky and is made worse off by each increase in its export price.     

Cognition and Extended (NSNX) Rational Choice: Some Early Results

The paper sketches a neoDarwinian model of cooperation, which is then used to analyze archived data from two prominent series of public goods experiments. Each of three tests supports a conjecture drawn from the model, but also reveals a cognitive complication. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Up to code: does your company's conduct meet world-class standards?

Codes of conduct have long been a feature of corporate life. Today, they are arguably a legal necessity--at least for public companies with a presence in the United States. But the issue goes beyond U.S. legal and regulatory requirements. Sparked by corruption and excess of various types, dozens of industry, government, investor, and multisector groups worldwide have proposed codes and guidelines to govern corporate behavior. These initiatives reflect an increasingly global debate on the nature of corporate legitimacy. Given the legal, organizational, reputational, and strategic considerations, few companies will want to be without a code. But what should it say? Apart from a handful of essentials spelled out in Sarbanes-Oxley regulations and NYSE rules, authoritative guidance is sorely lacking. In search of some reference points for managers, the authors undertook a systematic analysis of a select group of codes. In this article, they present their findings in the form of a "codex," a reference source on code content. The Global Business Standards Codex contains a set of overarching principles as well as a set of conduct standards for putting those principles into practice. The GBS Codex is not intended to be adopted as is, but is meant to be used as a benchmark by those wishing to create their own world-class code. The provisions of the codex must be customized to a company's specific business and situation; individual companies' codes will include their own distinctive elements as well. What the codex provides is a starting point grounded in ethical fundamentals and aligned with an emerging global consensus on basic standards of corporate behavior.     

加州伯克利分校哈斯商学院 社会责任能够提升公司业绩吗？

当前,公司若能把盈利和社会责任联系在一起,是一件有吸引力并且很时髦的事。如果你能创造出一种具有积极社会效益的商业模式,那就会形成一种多赢的局面,你的股东、雇员还有广大公众都能够受益。