A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.     

Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

Users' perceptions of the free,virtual-only service experience

Like manufacturing multinational enterprises, multinational banks, although being more subject to local regulation and market preferences, are increasingly changing their international attitude. Namely, they rely on foreign activities not only as a means to exploit their own competitive advantages within foreign markets, but also to access exclusive assets, resources, and competencies that could be transferred back to the whole network to enhance and strengthen their competitive advantages. The reported research refers to data on the evolution of the Italian banks' foreign initiatives in the 1998–2004 period. Using such data, the authors investigate the determinants of the coexistence of strategies that are both competence-exploiting and competence-enhancing, using the traditional eclectic approach.     

The cotton weaving industry in European countries: Size of firm,static and dynamic efficiency

This paper is based on the results of a field work analysis of the cotton weaving industry, focusing on the relationships between performance, size and structure of firms. The results are utilized to compare models of the industries in the main European countries and to evaluate their competitiveness in the light of both standard and some non-standard efficiency criteria.     

The impact of outward FDI on the home country's labour demand and skill composition

The present paper adds to the literature investigating the effects of outward FDI on the home country employment and skill composition. Considering the “industrial region” as the unit of the analysis, we capture both direct and indirect effects of foreign production on the parent company and its environment. The empirical evidence refers to the internationalisation of production by Italian firms throughout the period 1996–2002, and it shows that foreign activities have a negative impact upon the demand for low skilled workers in the parent company's “industrial region”, but also on the demand for high skilled workers when FDI are addressed to high income countries.     

Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device

We analyse the decision of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur on a Markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra-personal game. In such a case, each agent's incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self-restricted information. This conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance. All equilibria featuring this property strictly Pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs.     

Firm size and the adoption of flexible automation

Data on the diffusion of flexible automation systems in the Italian metalworking industry are used to point out the role of size for the adoption of complex, systemic innovations. Plant and firm sizes turn out to be positively correlated to adoption rates. Moreover, adoption is more likely, ceteris paribus, in plants which are part of large industrial groups. This pattern applies in general, and is particularly remarkable for more advanced solutions. In this light, guidelines for industrial policies that focus on financial support, the diffusion of industrial standards, and the correction of asymmetries in the availability of know-how and skills are proposed.Financial support for this paper was provided by the Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione (MPI 40% research funds). Grants from the Fondazione Mauro and the CNR research project Tecnologie Meccaniche are also acknowledged. The research took advantage of the FLAUTO database, set up at the Laboratorio di Economia dei Processi di Automazione, MIP-Politecnico di Milano.