Fiscal Consolidation and Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers*

This paper contributes to the established literature on fiscal consolidations by investigating the distinct behaviour of central and sub‐central tiers of government during general government consolidation attempts. In the light of different degrees of decentralisation across OECD countries, and the different responsibilities devolved to sub‐central tiers, we believe that this approach offers an illuminating insight into the analysis of fiscal consolidations and their success. We show that the involvement of the sub‐central tiers of government is crucial to achieving cuts in expenditure, particularly in relation to the overall size of the government wage bill. In addition, central governments appear to exert a strong influence on the expenditure of sub‐central tiers through their grant allocations, and control of these allocations appears to have a considerable impact upon the overall success of consolidation attempts. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a skewness in cuts towards sub‐central capital expenditure both when central governments cut grant allocations and when sub‐central governments engage in lone consolidation attempts.     

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Books reviewed in this article: Ralph Bryant, Dale Henderson, Gerald Holtham, Peter Hooper, Steven Symansky (eds) (1988) Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent Economies Marcello De Cecco and Alberto Giovannini (eds) (1989) A European Central Bank? Ralph Bryant, David Currie, Jacob Frenkel, Paul Masson and Richard Portes (eds) (1989), Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World Richard Cooper, Barry Eichengreen, Gerald Holtham, Robert Putnam and Randall Henning (1989) Can Nations Agree?     

A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?

We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design induces fiscal policymakers to implement unbiased responses to shocks. This is partly achieved by increasing the transparency of the decision-making process. We therefore call for more focused supervision tasks for the European Commission and for parliamentary discussion whenever a disagreement arises between the Commission and a national government.     

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets, i.e. by making it goal-independent     

Credibility and monetary policy in a model with growth

We examine the implications for monetary policy design of includinglearning-by-doing effects in a macroeconomic model. We showthat an inflation bias arises because monetary surprises maybe exploited to maximise potential output by temporarily raisingthe rate of human capital accumulation. Our model also providesan alternative explanation for the empirical evidence linkinginflation and growth, where the causal link goes from slow growthto high inflation. Unlike traditional credibility models, aninflationary bias can persist even when the authorities do notwish to offset labour market distortions through monetary surpriseswhich undercut the median voter's income.     

Macroeconomic shocks, structural change and real exchange rates: Evidence from historical data

We present empirical evidence on the forces driving real exchange rates in the long-run. Using data from the US, UK and Italy across different exchange rate regimes, we find support for the hypothesis that productivity and fiscal shocks matter. However, in some cases fiscal shocks cause depreciations, likely triggered by the monetary accommodation of fiscal shocks. We also find that the traditional Harrod–Balassa–Samuelson effect of productivity on real exchange rates is reversed in some cases, which confirms the importance of the distributive sector in driving productivity gains.     

Analyzing the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Does Fiscal Policy Play a Valuable Role in Stabilisation?

This paper provides an overview of recent papers which use estimatedNew Keynesian models to study the extent to which fiscal policycan be used to stabilize the economy. We use a variety of differentNew Keynesian models, estimated on data for both the US andfor the Euro area, and highlight the diverse transmission channelsthrough which fiscal policy acts in these models. Although wefind that fiscal policy can provide a useful complement to monetarypolicy, especially in models where consumers have finite horizons,there are important limitations to the value added of fiscalpolicy. (JEL E58, E62, E63)