Mandatory disclosure,greenhouse gas emissions and the cost of equity capital: UK evidence of a U-shaped relationship

This paper examines the effects of disclosing greenhouse gas (GHG) information mandatorily on the cost of equity capital (COC) using a longitudinal unbalanced panel database of the United Kingdom's FTSE 350 firms for the period 2011–2016. We use a nonlinear panel quantile regression (PQR) model to examine the relationship between GHG disclosure (GHGD) and COC in the United Kingdom. This technique was supplemented by conducting a two-step generalised method of moment (GMM) estimation to address any concerns related to the potential existence of endogeneity problems. Our findings suggest that high-level GHGD appeared to be negatively associated with COC up to a certain level, which is known as the turning point; then, any increase in GHGD is likely to increase the COC. This means that the nonlinear association between GHGD and COC is evidenced in our study and takes a U shape. Likewise, our findings are associative of a moderating effect of the 2013 carbon disclosure regulation (CDR) on the GHGD–COC nexus. We argue that mandatory GHGD and GHG risk are linked so that those companies that are associated with higher GHG risk have a tendency to be better disclosers. Consequently, we urge regulators to design GHGD regulations in a way that mirrors corporate environmental risk and leads to a lower COC in order to align the interests of corporations with those of the society at large.     

The use of the postal questionnaire in accounting history research

This methodological article discusses the first project in accounting history to use the postal questionnaire as a research tool. The historical context was the changing nature of the company audit in Britain, and this article outlines the process by which the questionnaire was devised, the stages through which the project developed, the data that were collected, and how these were analysed and interpreted. A significant innovation was to sample, in equal proportions, accountants who qualified in each decade from the 1920s and 1930s down to the 1980s, and direct the questioning toward their early training and careers, thereby generating historical trends in the responses. Some of the results of the survey are given here by way of illustrating the weaknesses and strengths/costs and benefits of the technique in comparison with oral history and traditional documentary sources.     

A generalized lot sizing model for the process cycling problem

Most scheduling/lot sizing models for the single-machine problem assume that aggregate demand equals aggregate production; and that backorders are to be avoided. Where working inventories are low, the scheduler may wish to avoid short production runs and willingly incur some backorder penalties so as to increase the length of production runs and reduce setup costs per unit of time. The model proposed here identifies optimal lot sizes with respect to the backorder/setup cost relationships. Use of the model will result in an optimally balanced inventory even when aggregate inventory levels are changing.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Corporate governance in a major British holding company: BSA in the interwar years

This paper uses a case study of BSA to examine corporate governance in a holding company during the interwar years. Recognised as generally progressive in its policy towards financial disclosure, nevertheless BSA attracted hostile criticism from its shareholders, showed little evidence of developing administrative coordination and provided limited detailed information concerning the performance of its subsidiaries. Voice did have an effect in changing the pattern of financial reporting, but even under the pressure of its banker, when financial circumstances deteriorated in the early 1930s, BSA was only prepared to change personnel while organisational structures remained in place.     

ACTION,AGENCIES, ADVOCACY,AND ANALYSTS1

Generally speaking, human beings dislike admitting flaws in their actions. The complexities of regional development provide ample opportunity for flawed action. As public intervention in the process of economic and social development is on the upswing, serious attention must be paid to evaluations in order to minimize flaws in the programs. This paper examines three constraints to evaluation: friction generated by data collection; absence of precise goals and modus operandi coupled with continuous program modification; and role conflict within the evaluation team. The difficulties with data lie in the definition of regional boundaries and hostility of the people resulting from normlessness and government involvement. Regional survey research centers are suggested to mitigate the problem. The second conistraint exists because of the sensitivity of program administrators to critical evaluation. They react with vague, general, and illusory goals, discounting and negation of results, and the concept of a pilot study from which “lessons learned always justify a program.” Long-run conditioning and public relations may be the only effective policies to relieve this constraint. The third constraint of role conflict has always existed but is particularly important when changes in programs derive from their evaluations. The solution is for our professions to insist on full public disclosure of results coupled with triyearly turnover of evaluation personnel. De façon générale, les humains détestent avouer leurs fautes. he dévelop-peraent régional étant trés complexe, beaucoup ?actions enterprises pourront s'avérer défectueuses ou néfastes. intervention publique dans le processus de développement économique et social se faisant peu fréqtiente, une attention spéciale et constante doit être apportée aux évaluations visant. à minimiser les erreurs dans les programmes. Cet article eiamine trois contraintes propres à?évaluation: obstacles crées par la cueilette des données; absence de buts prés et de modus operandi joints à une modification continuelle du programme; et conflit de rôle dans ?équipe ?évaluation. Les difficultés avec les données sont liées à la délimitation des régions et à?hostilityé des gens résultant de ?absence compléte de normes et de ?ingérence gouvernementale dans la vie privée. Pour résoudre le probléme, on suggére des centres ?enquétes et de recherches régionaux. La seconde contrainte vient du fait que les administrateurs de programme sont sensibles à une évaluation critique. lis répondent avec des buts vagues, généraux et illusoires; Us ne nient pas les résultats mais n'acceptent pas le concept ?une étude pilote óu “Les resultats obtenus justifient toujours un plan ?amélioration.” Un conditionnement à long terme et des relations extérienres peuvent être les settles politiques efficaces pour parer à cette contrainte. La troisiéme, due au conflit de rôle, a toujours existé mais elle est particu-liérement importante quand les modifications de programme dérivent de leurs évaluations. La solution serait que les associations professionnelles insistent sur une divulgation compléte des réstultats au public ainsi qu'un renouueUement du personnel ?évaluation tous les trois ans.