Output-Inflation Trade-Off at Near-Zero Inflation Rates

The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence about the cost of near-zero inflation using Japanese data. We test the hypothesis that the short-run Phillips curve becomes flatter as the rate of inflation approaches zero. In implementing the test, we pay special attention to how to control for other factors affecting the rate of inflation. First, we use the skewness of the distribution of relative-price changes as a measure of supply shocks. Second, we use information contained in the cross-prefecture Phillips curve to control for changes in the expected rate of inflation. Through a series of empirical analyses, we find evidences consistent with the hypothesis. In particular, we find that the estimated slope in the 1990s is smaller than before. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2000, 14(4), pp. 304–326. Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan and Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E31, E50     

Securely implementable social choice functions in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007) in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions. In these economies, although Saijo et al. (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, 1973) are securely implementable when the valuation functions of the public good are (i) differentiable, concave, and (ii) identified with a real number, respectively, this paper shows the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant when the valuation functions of the public good are strictly increasing and strictly concave.     

Conflict resolution with robustness in international negotiations: A game theoretic approach

A robust game theoretic approach for constructing effective international concords for conflict solving is discussed. Ann-person cooperative game in characteristic function form is used for international conflict solving via formation of coalitions. The nucleolus and the augmented nucleolus as solution concepts of the game are derived on its alternative forms, and robustness of the solutions when the evaluation of the coalition values is varied is examined. For solving this problem, parametric linear programming is used. This approach provides in a resemblant form an-alternative device to solving the fuzzy linear programming based on interval analysis.     

Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences

This paper studies secure implementability (Saijo et al. (2007) “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203–229) in linear production economies with classical preferences. Although secure implementability is in general stronger than the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points,” Review of Economic Studies 48, pp.587–597), this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under Pareto-efficient rules in the economies. In addition, this paper characterizes securely implementable and Pareto-efficient rules in the economies when the number of agents is two.     

Chronic Deflation in Japan

Japan has suffered from a long‐lasting but mild deflation since the latter half of the 1990s. Estimates of a standard Phillips curve indicate that a decline in inflation expectations, the negative output gap, and other factors such as a decline in import prices and a higher exchange rate all account for some of this development. These factors, in turn, reflect various underlying structural features of the Japanese economy. This paper examines a long list of these structural features that may explain Japan's chronic deflation, including the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, public attitudes toward the price level, central bank communication, weaker growth expectations coupled with declining potential growth or the lower natural rate of interest, risk‐averse banking behavior, deregulation, and the rise of emerging economies.     

Information Content of Internal Control Weaknesses: The Evidence from Japan

This paper investigates how capital markets in a code-law country, Japan, react to the disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICW). The Japanese government attempted to implement a more concise, efficient, and, thus, less strict internal control reporting system than Section 404 of the US-SOX. In fact, for the first two years, the disclosure rate of ICW has been much lower in Japan than in the U.S. While market reactions to the disclosure of ICW are not significantly different from zero in our event study analysis, they become significantly negative after controlling for other information released around the disclosure date, audit quality, and other firm attributes. Our results are consistent with the notion that the disclosure of ICW is informative to the market because it is less frequent and exceptional in Japan.     

An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions

This paper investigates the relationship between secure implementability (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007) and full implementability in truthful strategies (Nicolò in Rev Econ Des 8:373–382, 2004). Although secure implementability is in general stronger than full implementability in truthful strategies, this paper shows that both properties are equivalent under the social choice function that satisfies non-wastefulness (Li and Xue in Econ Theory, doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0724-0) in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions.