On the Composition of Committees

This article is concerned with the role of committees in collectivedecision making processes in a world where agents must be motivatedto collect information. Committees improve the quality of decisionmaking by providing information and by coordinating the collectionof information. We address two types of questions. First, howdoes the composition of a committee affect final decisions?Second, what is the optimal composition of a committee fromthe decision maker's point of view? As to the latter question,we show that the cost of information collection plays an importantrole. If this cost is low, then the preferences of the committeemembers should be aligned to those of the decision maker. Memberswith similar preferences as the decision maker collect the properpieces of information. Moreover, manipulation of informationdoes not occur if the preferences of the decision maker andthe members are consonant. If the cost of searching is high,then the committee should be composed of members with polarizedpreferences. Outliers have a strong incentive to search forinformation.     

SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF TAX‐BASED STIMULUS PACKAGES?

We investigate the effects of tax policy shocks on the U.S. economy over the 1972:3–2008:4 period within a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) framework. Disaggregating tax shocks suggests that the positive output multipliers documented for total taxes by the previous literature are present only for indirect tax innovations. We also show that both labor and corporate taxes have similar effects on output, with labor tax multipliers being slightly larger in magnitude. The positive and negative responses of inflation following respectively corporate and labor tax shocks imply that former shocks work through aggregate supply, whereas the latter work predominantly through aggregate demand. (JEL C32, E62, H20)     

The World Market for Labor and the World Market for Industrial Sites

At the center of the on-going debate about the U.S. Social Security system is the question of whether the way the system is financed can cope with the future challenges posed by the retiring Baby Boom generation. The "reformers" suggest changing the design of the system by moving to fully funded defined contribution retirement plans. Others argue that the so-called demographic problems are being used as an excuse to privatize the system. But both sides spend almost all of their energy and time figuring out the timing of insolvency of the system and the validity of the assumptions made in each forecast. In contrast, the present study closely examines the changing macroeconomic dynamics of the system since the 1960s. The analysis shows that undermining of the system is caused not by demographic changes or financing mechanisms but by low wages and medical inflation.     

Chinese Walls in German Banks*

Analysts in a bank’s research department cover firms that have no relationship with the bank as well as companies in which the bank has a strategic interest. Officially, banks must establish Chinese Walls around their research departments to allow the analysts to work independently and to avoid the flow of insider information. We examine analyst behavior under long-term bank-firm relationships using ownership data and analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for German companies from 1994 to 2001. We find evidence that is consistent with analysts reconciling their employers’ interests with their own career concerns. They seem to use their information advantage strategically by releasing favorable and thereby more precise reports when the market underestimates earnings. In order not to jeopardize the bank-client relationship, they suppress negative information when the market is too optimistic. Combining situations where the market over- and underestimates earnings, we can replicate the unconditional positive bias in analyst forecasts found in the previous literature. Despite the bias in affiliated analysts’ forecasts, they nonetheless selectively communicate valuable information to investors. *We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of I/B/E/S International Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data. This data has been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectations research. We thankfully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) under the Jubil?umsfonds grant number 8523. We thank Werner Antweiler, Michael Halling, Helmut Elsinger, Evelyn Hayden, Greg Hebb, Cornelia Kullmann, Kai Li, Colin Mayer, Stefan Pichler, Duane Seppi, Alex Stomper, Neal Stoghton, Michael Stutzer, Suresh Sundaresan, Yishay Yafeh, Josef Zechner, Christine Zulehner, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at UBC, the Northern Finance Association meetings, the Western Finance Association meetings, and the European Finance Association meetings for helpful comments and Eva Smolen for excellent research assistance.