Dynamic Stock Markets with Multiple Assets: An Experimental Analysis

We study the performance of the rational expectations hypothesis in multiperiod experimental markets with multiple assets. We find that the markets are generally inefficient from the point of view of full information aggregation. However, arbitrage relationships hold, and it is not possible to detect the informational inefficiency by using some standard tests of market efficiency. These findings suggest that the lack of arbitrage opportunities and the failure of common tests to reject inefficiency are not sufficient to conclude that a market is informationally efficient.     

DOES DISAGGREGATION AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE AND GDP? AN ANALYSIS USING REGIME SHIFTS*

This paper investigates the impact of policy shifts on disaggregated health expenditure‐GDP relationship in Australia. In contrast to previous studies the disaggregation is at the level of type of service delivered and not at the level of source of expenditure. Our results show that the subcomponents of health expenditure exhibit different patterns of behaviour at both cointegration and unit root stages once policy shifts or structural breaks are allowed in the empirical analysis. When the possibility of structural break is allowed we find a significant long‐run relationship between subcomponents of aggregate health expenditure and GDP that is not observed when break is not allowed. The underlying reasons for the occurrence of breaks and policy lessons are discussed subsequently.     

An Analytical Model for External Auditor Evaluation of the Internal Audit Function Using Belief Functions

The purpose of this paper is to advance research in internal audit (IA) evaluation by developing an IA assessment model that considers interrelationships among specific factors used by external auditors to evaluate the strength of the IA function. The model is based on three factors identified by auditing standards and by prior academic research: Competence, Work Performance, and Objectivity. We develop an analytical expression of the model using the belief function framework in order to overcome limitations of prior research. Our results reveal that modeling the “And” relationship is essential for assessing the strength of the IA function. As far as interrelationships are concerned, the analysis shows that, when the three factors have a strong or a perfect relationship, the strength of the IA function remains high even if there is positive or negative evidence about one of the factors. This result holds as long as there are high levels of belief about the other two factors. Further, we demonstrate how the quality of corporate governance affects the evaluation of the IA function and how a cost–benefit analysis can be applied to this framework to help determine the amount of external audit work needed to comply with standards. Our analysis reveals that the extent of external audit work to be carried out by the external auditor depends on the strength of the IA function and the amount of litigation and regulatory costs likely to be faced by the external auditor.     

Risk Aversion and Arbitrage

This paper characterizes conditions under which asset returns and consumption are consistent with risk-averse preferences. It is shown that risk aversion is equivalent to “zero arbitrage” on a transformation of the payoff space. The implicit state prices which are dual to this no-arbitrage condition can be interpreted as prices of “pure consumption hedges.” This zero-arbitrage restriction implies the usual restrictions associated with nonsatiation. The analysis holds in both complete and incomplete market settings.     

Un modèle analytique d’évaluation de l’audit interne faisant appel aux fonctions de croyance, à l’usage de l’auditeur externe

Les auteurs ont pour but de faire progresser la recherche dans le domaine de l’évaluation de l’audit interne en élaborant un modèle d’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne qui tient compte des relations entre les facteurs précis qu’utilisent les auditeurs externes pour évaluer la solidité de cette fonction. Le modèle repose sur trois facteurs définis par les normes d’audit et par les travaux de recherche antérieurs : la compétence, la qualité du travail et l’objectivité. Les auteurs élaborent une expression analytique du modèle à l’aide du cadre de référence des fonctions de croyance afin de dépasser les limites des études antérieures. Leurs résultats révèlent que la modélisation de la relation « et » est essentielle à l’évaluation de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne. Au chapitre des relations, l’analyse montre que, lorsque celle qui unit ces trois facteurs est solide ou parfaite, la fonction d’audit interne demeure d’une grande solidité, même en présence d’éléments probants positifs ou négatifs à l’égard de l’un des facteurs. Ce résultat persiste dans la mesure où les niveaux de croyance au sujet des deux autres facteurs sont élevés. Les auteurs démontrent en outre comment la qualité de la gouvernance d’entreprise influe sur l’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne et comment il est possible de recourir à l’analyse coûts‐avantages dans ce contexte pour mieux déterminer la quantité de travail d’audit externe qu’exige le respect des normes. L’analyse des auteurs révèle que l’étendue du travail d’audit devant être réalisé par l’auditeur externe dépend de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne et de l’importance des coûts associés aux litiges et au respect de la réglementation auxquels le vérificateur externe doit faire face.     

Bayesian Fraud Risk Formula for Financial Statement Audits

In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.