THE SWEDISH MARKET PRICE APPROACH TO MONETARY POLICY OF THE 1930s

Recently, some analysts have prescribed the combined use of certain market prices as a useful strategy for monetary policy. In light of problems with conventional (time-series) empirical tests of the approach, one may consider an alternative "test" of this strategy: examining historical episodes when the strategy was employed. The Swedish experience during the early 1930s provides one such example. This experience, fathered by Knut Wicksell, is an example of a fiat money-flexible exchange rate regime in which (i) a short-term interest rate was used as a policy instrument, (ii) market prices were used as policy guides or intermediate indicators, and (Hi) price stability was the explicitly voiced goal of monetary policy. Monetary or reserve aggregates were neither proposed nor employed as policy guides or targets in pursuing this price stabilization objective. This Swedish experience is important since it provides a rare example of a market price approach to monetary policy. This paper demonstrates that the approach worked remarkably well.     

ON MEASURING THE EFFECT OF INFLATION UNCERTAINTY ON REAL GNP GROWTH

In this paper we re-examine the relationship between inflationuncertainty and total output. To properly specify an estimatingequation, we investigate the time series properties of two frequentlyused measures of inflation uncertainty. We fail to reject thehypothysis that each series has a unit root. However, the uncertaintymeasures are not cointegrated with output and relative oil prices.This means that the proper specification is in terms of differences.With this specification we find that an increase in inflationuncertainty growth reduces real GNP growth but, unlike earlierwork, we find that this effect is temporary. It is also unlikelythat an inflation uncertainty shock on its own could producea recession.     

Do They Have Your Number? Understanding the Moderating Role of Format Effects and Consumer Numeracy for Quantitative Front‐of‐Package Nutrition Claims

Front‐of‐package (FOP) nutrient content claims are often used by food manufacturers to promote the nutrition levels of their products. In this research, two studies examine the influence of the numerical format (either percentages or absolute numbers) presented on FOP‐reduced nutrient content claims and the moderating influence of consumers' numeracy levels (i.e., consumers' ability to interpret numbers). Low numerate consumers are more strongly influenced by the label's numerical format, but results differ across nutrition attributes linked to cardiovascular disease risk. For saturated fat, low numerate consumers had more favorable evaluations of the product that had a label presented in a percent format compared to an absolute unit format. In contrast, the moderating effect of numeracy had little effect on the format of reduced sodium claims. Implications are offered for policymakers, consumer researchers, and food manufacturers .     

Stillbirth registration and perceptions of infant death, 1900–60: the Scottish case in national context1

The history of vital registration has attracted substantial attention from both social historians and historical demographers. While much of that research has touched upon issues of fertility and mortality, the contentious issue of the stillborn child—which falls somewhere between the two—has been largely neglected. Although civil birth and death registration was introduced to Scotland in 1855, stillbirth registration did not begin until 1939. Using a range of legal, medical, and statistical evidence, this article explores the history of stillbirth registration in Scotland from a social history perspective. It outlines the problems associated with lack of stillbirth registration, the processes that eventually led to registration of the stillborn child, and the wider significance of that registration.     

Forecasts of earnings per share: Possible sources of analyst superiority and bias*

Abstract. Previous research has shown that analysts' forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (EPS) are more accurate than those of accepted time-series models. In addition, some previous research suggests that, on average, analysts' forecasts tend to be optimistic (i.e., biased). Two explanations for analysts' superiority have been proposed: (1) analysts use more recent information than can time-series models and (2) analysts use forecast-relevant information not included in the time-series of past earnings. This paper provides evidence on a third potential source of analyst superiority: the possibility that humans can use past earnings data to predict future earnings more accurately than can mechanical time-series models. We find that human judges do no worse than accepted time-series models when both use the same information set: namely, the series of past EPS figures. To date, little or no research has attempted to determine why analyst bias might exist. Still, some possible reasons have been forwarded. First, pessimistic forecasts or reports may hinder future efforts of the analyst or the analyst's employer to obtain information from the company being analyzed. Second, forecast data bases may suffer a selection bias if analysts tend to stop following those firms that they perceive as performing poorly. This study proposes, and provides evidence regarding, a third possible explanation for analyst bias: the use of judgmental heuristics by analysts. Many studies have shown that human predictions are often biased because of the use of such heuristics. We present evidence that suggests this may be the case for analysts' forecasts of earnings per share. Résumé. De précédents travaux de recherche ont démontré que les prévisions des analystes relatives au bénéfice par action (BPA) trimestriel sont plus exactes que celles que permettent d'obtenir les modèles reconnus basés sur les séries chronologiques. De plus, les résultats de certains travaux de recherche laissent croire qu'en moyenne, les prévisions des analystes tendent à être optimistes (c'est-à-dire biaisées). Deux explications à cette supériorité ont été proposées: 1) l'information que les analystes utilisent est plus récente que celles utilisées dans les modèles fondés sur les séries chronologiques et 2) les analystes utilisent de l'information pertinente aux prévisions qui ne figure pas dans les séries chronologiques relatives aux bénéfices passes. Les auteurs attribuent à un troisième facteur potentiel cette supériorité: la possibilité pour les humains d'utiliser les données relatives aux bénéfices passés pour prédire les bénéfices futurs de façon plus précise que ne le peuvent les modèles fondés sur les séries chronologiques. Ils en viennent à la conclusion que les humains obtiennent des résultats tout aussi efficaces que les modèles chronologiques reconnus lorsqu'ils utilisent un jeu de renseignements identique, soit les données historiques relatives au BPA. Jusqu'à maintenant, peu de chercheurs, sinon aucun, ont tenté de déterminer à quoi tiendrait l'existence d'un biais chez l'analyste. Malgré tout, certaines explications possibles ont été proposées. Premièrement, les prévisions ou les rapports pessimistes peuvent faire obstacle aux efforts futurs de l'analyste ou de son employeur pour obtenir de l'information de la société faisant l'objet de l'analyse. Deuxièmement, les bases de données servant à la prévision peuvent être entachées d'un biais de sélection si les analystes ont tendance à cesser de suivre les entreprises qui leur semblent afficher une piètre performance. Les auteurs proposent et attestent une troisième explication possible du biais de l'analyste: l'utilisation de méthodes heuristiques fondées sur le jugement. De nombreuses études ont démontré que les prédictions humaines sont souvent biaisées par suite de l'utilisation de ces méthodes heuristiques. Les auteurs apportent des arguments qui permettent de croire que ce pourrait être le cas des prévisions des analystes du bénéfice par action.     

The Cross‐Section of Managerial Ability,Incentives, and Risk Preferences

I estimate a dynamic investment model for mutual managers to study the cross‐sectional distribution of ability, incentives, and risk preferences. The manager's compensation depends on the size of the fund, which fluctuates due to fund returns and due to fund flows that respond to the fund's relative performance. The model provides an economic interpretation of time‐varying coefficients in performance regressions in terms of the structural parameters. I document that the estimates of fund alphas are precise and virtually unbiased. I find substantial heterogeneity in ability, risk preferences, and pay‐for‐performance sensitivities that relates to observable fund characteristics.     

Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other bank characteristics, multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.