Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking with Commerce: Evidence from American History

Much of the discussion about banking and commerce in America has failed to make several crucial distinctions and has not accounted for many arrangements that have promoted the mixing of these activities. We investigate the history of banking and commerce in the United States, looking both at bank control of commercial firms and commercial firms' control of banks. We trace how these controls have changed with shifting definitions of "bank" and changing methods of "control." Despite the regulations prohibiting some arrangements that promote financial control, we find evidence of extensive linkages between banking and commerce in the United States. These linkages usually build on devices that are very close substitutes to the arrangements prohibited by law. Altogether, our findings question the often made claim that traditionally banking in the United States has been separated from commerce. Furthermore, given that research on Japan and Germany has shown that the mixing of banking and commerce matters for a variety of issues, our evidence also raises some questions on similar research in the United States which makes the simplifying assumption that these industries are separated.     

Pricing Options on an Asset with Bernoulli Jump-Diffusion Returns

The price movements of certain assets can be modeled by stochastic processes that combine continuous diffusion with discrete jumps. This paper compares values of options on assets with no jumps, jumps of fixed size, and jumps drawn from a lognormal distribution. It is shown that not only the magnitude but also the direction of the mispricing of the Black-Scholes model relative to jump models can vary with the distribution family of the jump component. This paper also discusses a methodology for the numerical valuation, via a backward induction algorithm, of American options on a jump-diffusion asset whose early exercise may be profitable. These cannot, in general, be accurately priced using analytic models. The procedure has the further advantage of being easily adaptable to nonanalytic, empirical distributions of period returns and to nonstationarity in the underlying diffusion process.     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

Book Review

Books reviewed:
Ira A. Jackson and Jane Nelson, Profits with Principles: Seven Strategies for Delivering Values with Values .     

Half-Way House or Dead End?

Education vouchers ore conventionally attacked by commentators who prefer to maintain the dominance of the srate in the supply of education. Richard Henderson, of the stockbrokers Sheppards & Chase, analyses the vulnerability of vouchers to capture by pressure group and therefore argues for a genuine market in education without the compromise of vouchers.