Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118.     

Broadband Demand Analysis for Network Building

An increase of broadband demand is forecasted by transitional methods that consider the effect of this increase through many factors, such as customer requirement diversification, and new service introduction and deployment under competition. Broadband demand forecasting has become important for closing the digital divide, promoting regional developments, and constructing networks economically; therefore, a demand forecast model that considers the mechanisms of market structure is necessary. In this paper, a demand analysis method for broadband access combining macro- and micro-data mining is proposed, and the service choice behaviour of customers is introduced as a customer model not only to express the macro trend of market structure, but also to consider area marketing. The proposed method can estimate the potential demand, determine the point at which broadband demand growth peaks in a specified area, and support a decision for ultra high-speed broadband access facility installation.     

Hyperbolic Discounting,Borrowing Aversion and Debt Holding

Analysis of an original Internet‐based survey reveals that debt holding is related to time discounting through: (i) present bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized hyperbolic discount function; (ii) borrowing aversion, captured by a sign effect in that future losses are discounted at lower rates than future gains; and (iii) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate. Hyperbolic respondents are classified naïve if their answers reveal them to be time‐inconsistent procrastinators, and otherwise sophisticated. Naïve respondents with more steeply declining impatience are more likely to be debtors. The sign effect relates negatively to borrowing. Survey responses indicative of high or declining impatience are associated with credit card borrowing and other overborrowing indicators.     

When is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?

We study two-person complete-information bargaining games in a non-cooperative setting. The alternating-offers model in Rubinstein (1982) is modified so that players negotiate each time about who will make the next proposal. Under this rule, there are multiple equilibria and there can be a prolonged delay. The multiplicity and the possibility of delay remain either when offers have to be made alternately (under Restriction A) or when the players cannot increase their demands over time (under Restriction N). Only when both of these restrictions are imposed does the immediate settlement predicted by Rubinstein's original model emerge as the unique equilibrium.
JEL Classification Number: C78.     

EKC-type transitions and environmental policy under pollutant uncertainty and cost irreversibility

Previous studies have suggested that some pollutant levels first increases due to the economic growth and then start decreasing, the pattern being called the “environmental Kuznets curve” (EKC). We examine EKC-type transitions of pollutant levels not with respect to economic growth but more generally in time. Assuming that each policy maker optimally executes the two switching options of regulation and unregulation for pollution, the switching dynamics of environmental policy can be described by an alternating renewal process. It is shown that the double Laplace transform of transition density of a pollutant level can be obtained by a novel application of renewal theory. The expected level of overall pollutants is then calculated numerically and found to exhibit either a Λ‐shaped or an N-shaped pattern in time. Our results present a simple explanation for the EKC-type transitions of pollutant levels within a real options framework.     

Fiscal policy,wealth divergence,and lifetime utility

Using a two-country dynamic optimization model where the less patient country decumulates and the more patient one accumulates wealth, we analyze spillover effects of lump-sum and consumption taxes. A lump-sum tax on a country definitely harms the other country through a change in the rate of interest. A lump-sum tax on either country always improves the less patient country's asset position. A consumption tax has no spillover effect, although it is Pareto-inferior. Applying these results into a closed-country context with heterogeneous agents, we also discuss policy implications of a discriminatory tax.     

Interindustry flows, non-traded intermediate goods and the theory of effective protection : A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the response of net and gross outputs of tradeable goods to changes in tariff structure in the context of a comprehensive general equilibrium model with interindustry flows and non-traded, as well as imported, intermediate goods. There are two major results. First, the nominal rate of tariffs on a tradeable good is shown to correctly indicate the movements of its net output under most general conditions. Second, the (modified and) generalized Corden index of effective protection for a tradeable good is revealed to be in a close relationship with the behavior of its gross output under certain restrictions on the input substitutability of industries.     

LUXURY AND WEALTH*

I develop a dynamic theory of luxury consumption, particularly emphasizing the causal effect that pursuit of luxury goods has on wealth accumulation. A quasi‐luxury is defined as a good whose marginal rate of substitution is increasing in a utility index. Under certain conditions, it is indeed a luxury good. When current wealth holding falls short of (exceeds) long‐run needs, luxury consumption is postponed more (less) easily than necessity consumption, due to a lower (higher) time preference for luxury and/or a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution thereof. Preferences for quasi‐luxuries lead to a higher steady‐state value of wealth or capital.

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Strategic Investment Decisions under Uncertainty,Tacit Collusion and Product Differentiation

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty, tacit collusion and product differentiation on strategic investment policy. The model demonstrates the equilibrium under competitive investments and under cooperative investments. In competitive investments, two firms compete by investing to preempt each other, and ultimately one firm invests earlier than its rival. In cooperative investments, two firms invest simultaneously and collude on their outputs. Cooperative investments are likely to be sustainable only under conditions of high volatility of future demand, low probability of market extinction and high degree of product differentiation, while competitive investments are sustainable for any set of these parametric values.