Has the ‘franc fort’ exchange rate policy affected the inflationary dynamics? Theory and new evidence

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the ‘franc fort’ policy implemented in France from 1983 on the inflationary dynamics by means of a square root Kalman filter approach. An interesting aspect of the analysis is the evidence that the ‘franc fort’ exchange rate policy had a significant impact on the inflationary dynamics in France through its credibility effects. These results confirm the imported credibility hypothesis according to which the French authorities accelerated the disinflation process by importing the German monetary policy credibility through the ‘hard peg’ of the franc–DM exchange rate. These findings show that inflation dynamics in France began to converge significantly to that in Germany after the implementation of the ‘franc fort’ policy, making more credible the plan for the final transition to the euro. Moreover, this analysis may also reveal much about the nature of potential success of the current initiative of the new member countries now in the process of joining the EU and looking eventually to adopt the euro.     

Monetary Union Enlargement,Fiscal Policy,and Strategic Wage Setting*

This contribution develops a framework for studying the effects of the enlargement of a monetary union on macroeconomic performances in the presence of strategic interactions between non‐atomistic labor unions, monetary, and fiscal authorities. We show that the integration of new identical member countries may have beneficial effects, depending on the fiscal policymaking structure. Qualifications to this result are provided under cross‐country asymmetries in the size of the economies, the structure of the labor markets, and the fiscal authorities' preferences.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

The sustainability of fiscal policies in the European Union

This paper examines the stationarity of the inclusive-of-interest public deficit for five European Union economies, four of them being recently selected for entry into the European Monetary Union. Unit root tests are used not only to examine structural breaks and cointegration analysis, but also to investigate for regime shifts. They support the occurrence of sustainable deficits for the Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese economies. On the contrary, Italy and Belgium may incur unsustainable deficits, implying that their selection in Phase 2 of the European Monetary Union is questionable. This paper was presented at the Forty-Fifth International Atlantic Economic Conference, Rome, Italy, March 14–21, 1998.     

Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?

Recent empirical contributions demonstrate that countries with less independent central banks enjoy lower output losses during disinflationary cycles. To explain these somewhat surprising empirical findings, some authors suggest that independent central banks probably face a flatter short-run Phillips curve. In this paper, we provide both theoretical and empirical arguments to rationalize this intuition. We demonstrate that, since central bank independence reduces the mean inflation rate and its variance, wage setters opt for a lower degree of nominal wage indexation leading to more wage and price inertia and, thus, to a flatter short-run Phillips curve. Consequently, this paper put forward a channel of positive influence of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio through its impact on nominal wage indexation. Empirical tests, performed using a sample of 19 OECD countries during the 1960–1990 period, show that these theoretical results hold also empirically.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union.