SEQUENTIAL MERGERS WITH DIFFERING DIFFERENTIATION LEVELS*

We study sequential merger incentives under presence of product differentiation. Two sets of firms produce closely related goods, whereas each set produces more differentiated goods. Merger incentives under product differentiation are found to be stronger for two firms producing closely related goods than more differentiated goods. Also, after one merger, other firms are willing to follow with their own merger, resulting in sequential mergers. This result is consistent with the recent mergers in the video game software industry in Japan.     

日本地方政府预算研究与启示

日本以地方财政计划作为地方政府预算的中心环节,并将地方税返还制度列入该计划,以保障和调整地方财源,满足地方公共支出需要。针对目前出现的地方财力不足,以及中央财政对地方财政补充不足的现实状况,日本正在进行三位一体的地方分权改革与财政体制改革。日本地方政府预算制度与改革的经验与教训对于切实推进中国的分税制改革,发挥地方政府财政计划功能、改革政府财政架构、建立公开透明的政府财政预算体系以及制定科学的地方财政保证方法等方面有着重要的启示作用。     

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In a two‐sector model of monopolistic competition, this paper explores what impacts an expansion of government spending on public services has on national income. In the short run where entry and exit of firms are restricted, a rise in government spending on services like health care (which has only a role of substituting for market services) increases national income, but that on services like elderly care (which has not only this role but also another role of contributing to home production of services) decreases it. These results are reversed in the long run. Welfare effects of public services are also examined.     

SELF‐CONTROL PROBLEMS AND CONSUMPTION‐SAVING DECISIONS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*

Time‐discounting is a fundamental preference which affects wealth accumulation. If people are impatient, they may spend their earnings instantaneously, and do not save enough for the future. People are often time‐inconsistent, i.e., they often put exceptionally high value on immediate consumption compared to any time in the future. Whether they are aware or not, these individuals are susceptible to self‐control problems. In this paper, we review theoretical and empirical research on time‐inconsistency and self‐control problems, particularly on consumption and saving, and discuss their policy implications.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

A CURRENT JAPANESE INTERPRETATION OF MAX WEBER

The author tries to clarify some characteristics in the context of the intellectual history of Japan with regard to how and what aspects of Max Weber's theories have been introduced by Japanese social scientists. Max Weber's influence on Japan is so great that it is impossible to discuss the whole of it. Accordingly, in this article, the author refers only to a few social scientists who are notable from the viewpoint of some important problems, such as “overcoming modernity,’ etc. Some aspects which are peculiar to the interpretation of Weber's theories on Oriental society in Japan are dealt with in relation to the author's interests in the last part of this article.     

STABILITY OF THE COURNOT SOLUTION AND FREE ENTRY: A NOTE*

Taking a traditional approach, I show that by using the discrete adjustment system, the Cournot solution in a free entry oligopoly with increasing returns to scale is stable only when the number of firms is very small. We must pay attention to stability when using the free entry Cournot oligopoly model.     

On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests

There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in a general asymmetric rent‐seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players.