Systematic Political Grass–Root Support for Tariffs

The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.     

The establishment-size wage premium: evidence from European countries

This study examines the magnitude and determinants of the establishment-size wage premium in five European countries using a unique harmonised matched employer–employee data set (the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey). This data set enables to test the validity of various traditional explanations of the size wage gap (i.e. the labour quality hypothesis, the theory of compensating wage differentials, the role of monitoring and institutions) and of more recent hypotheses (i.e. size differences in job stability and in the concentration of skilled workers). We find some support for traditional explanations, but there remains a significant wage premium for workers employed in large establishments. Further results indicate that the magnitude of this premium fluctuates substantially across countries and appears to be negatively correlated with the degree of corporatism.     

Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and international trade

This paper studies the relationship between bilateral trade patterns and opinions. It uses the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys published by the European Commission, which provide data on the share of the population in each EU15 member country in favour of each CEEC joining the EU. Our results first suggest that bilateral opinions have a statistically robust and relatively large effect on imports, even when standard and new covariates capturing proximity between countries are controlled for. We interpret this effect as reflecting a positive impact of “bilateral affinity” on trade patterns. We also show that it is possible to go some way towards explaining the variance in bilateral opinions among our sample. Last we provide some preliminary attempt to determine causality between bilateral opinions and imports.     

Identification and information in monotone binary models

This paper considers binary response models where errors are uncorrelated with a set of instrumental variables and are independent of a continuous regressor v$v$, conditional on all other variables. It is shown that these exclusion restrictions are not sufficient for identification and that additional identifying assumptions are needed. Such an assumption, introduced by Lewbel [Semiparametric qualitative response model estimation with unknown heteroskedasticity or instrumental variables. Journal of Econometrics 97, 145–177], is that the support of the continuous regressor is large, but we show that it significantly restricts the class of binary phenomena which can be analysed. We propose an alternative additional assumption under which β$\beta$ remains just identified and the estimation unchanged. This alternative assumption does not impose specific restrictions on the data, which broadens the scope of the estimation method in empirical work. The semiparametric efficiency bound of the model is also established and an existing estimator is shown to achieve that bound. The efficient estimator uses a plug-in density estimate. It is shown that plugging in the true density rather than an estimate is inefficient. Extensions to ordered choice models are provided.     

Two implications of habit formation for international trade

A country's choice set of trade policies becomes very constrained when its consumers are subject to habit formation. Free trade may, in fact, lie outside the choice set. Furthermore, the rise in import elasticities' values over time can be attributed to habit formation.     

Heterogeneous Mortgage Markets: Implications for Business Cycles and Welfare in the EMU

This paper evaluates business cycle effects of asymmetric cross‐country mortgage market developments in a monetary union. By employing a two‐country New Keynesian DSGE model with collateral constraints tied to housing values, we show that a change in institutional characteristics of mortgage markets, such as the loan‐to‐value (LTV) ratio, is an important driver of asymmetric developments in housing markets and economic activity. Our analysis suggests that the home country where credit standards are lax booms, while the rest of European Monetary Union faces a negative output gap. Overall welfare is lower if LTV ratios are higher.     

The Political Economy of Education and Development in an Open Economy

If the price effect of opening up a developing economy may be expected to act as a disincentive for investment in human capital, the opposite is likely to be true of the income effect, especially in the presence of credit market imperfections among the poor. It is shown in this paper that this may no longer be the case in a society initially dominated by an oligarchic capitalist elite that is afraid of losing its political control in favor of an educated middle class. Although it may sometimes be in its interest to democratize by subsidizing education when the economy is closed, incentives to do so disappear when the economy is open to trade or factor flows.     

IMF surveillance as a signal to attract foreign investment

Poor governance and endemic corruption hamper the efforts of some developing countries to attract foreign investment. Incentive schemes based on verifiable signals of varying costs and quality can be helpful in encouraging their governments to intensify corruption-control efforts. This paper ranks alternative signals, including surveillance by the IMF and other IFIs (International Financial Institutions), as catalysts for private foreign investments. We demonstrate that the ranking crucially depends on the bargaining strength of governments relative to foreign investors. If foreign lenders control the bargain, IFI signals are the first choice. If governments are in control, IFI signals become the choice of last resort.