ON CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, WAGE INDEXING AND A MONOPOLY UNION

The Rogoff proposition (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985), pp. 1169–90) that it is socially optimal to delegate monetary policy to a central banker that is more inflation‐averse than society has been widely accepted and implemented in practice. However, there is a literature that argues that, if there is an inflation‐averse monopoly union in the economy, it is optimal to delegate monetary policy to an ‘ultra‐liberal’ central banker, i.e., a central banker that is interested only in output. In this paper, we examine whether introducing wage indexing into the latter models has any effect on the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness and find that, once a monopoly‐type labour union is introduced, wage indexing does not matter for the determination of the optimal degree of conservativeness of the monetary authority.     

Is 2?% the optimal inflation rate for the Euro Area?

According to the relevant literature, monetary policy implications concerning the optimal inflation rate can be derived by examining the relationship between inflation and the Relative Price Variability (RPV). This paper studies this issue for selected Euro Area (EA) countries, using monthly data for the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. In particular, semi-parametric estimations are employed so as to find the accurate form of the inflation-RPV relationship. The results indicate that this relationship exhibits a U-shape functional profile. Furthermore, the optimal inflation rates for the EA, France, Germany and Spain are also calculated. For all countries and the EA, we find that although the European Central Bank’s “below but close to 2?%” inflation target is optimal for the EA average, it is not the optimum inflation rate for the individual counties.